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continued support of the regime's conditional guardian, the
military, and his ability to manage an intricate network of
political clients. Despite the forces of modernization,
political influence in Egypt rests with the traditional
leadership of the rural elite and their urban family linkages.
As such, a major threat to the regime's internal stability
would not likely arise without the support of traditional
rural elites, whose interests are strongly represented in
the military. The masses are likely to resort to extra-legal
activities only when fundamental values are threatened. Such
threats are limited to any deterioration in the government's
identification with Islam, a reduction in the already marginal
standard of living or any perceived threat to continued
Egyptian independence from any foreign power including the
United States or Israel.
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This thesis analyzes Egyptian political culture and the
directive effect which it has upon political development,
elite recruitment and the nature of political participation.
The pervasive nature of Islam and the centrality of kinship
remain the basic factors in determining the nature of politi-
cal participation in Egypt's non- institutional and personalist
politics. The basis of Sadat's control, like that of his
predecessor, rests with his continued support of the regime's
conditional guardian, the military, and his ability to
manage an intricate network of political clients. Despite
the forces of modernization, political influence in Egypt rests
with the traditional leadership of the rural elite and their
urban family linkages. As such, a major threat to the regime's
internal stability would not likely arise without the support
of traditional rural elites, whose interests are strongly
represented in the military. The masses are likely to resort
to extra-legal activities only when fundamental values are
threatened. Such threats are limited to any deterioration
in the government's identification with Islam, a reduction
in the already marginal standard of living or any perceived
threat to continued Egyptian independence from any foreign
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the nature of political participa-
tion within Egyptian domestic politics in the post-revolu-
tionary period from 1952 to the present. During the period
under study, the major change in Egyptian political develop-
ment was the emergence of a new modernizing elite of mili-
tary officers under the leadership of Gamal Abd al-Nasir.
Nasir's personalist rule was characterized by non-institu-
tional authority patterns, despite the existence of a series
of single-party structures. Upon his succession to power,
Anwar al-Sadat initiated a policy of limited liberalization
that included the re-establishment of competitive party poli-
tics and the development of a "state of institutions." It
is anticipated that Sadat's reforms are aimed at restricting
political participation within institutions that he can per-
sonally control and use to delimit the pervasive role of the
military or other challengers to his regime.
Participation will be analyzed in relation to the applica-
bility of the so-called "implicit theory of evolutionary
democracy" within Egyptian political development. Recent
The "implicit theory of evolutionary democracy" argues that
the modernization process puts demands on the political system
for the gradual attainment of universal participation. These
demands on the political system are usually referred to as the
"participation crisis." For further discussion of this concept,
see Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in
Egypt," in Political Parties and Political Development
, pp. 217-
240, ed. by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (Princeton:
Princeton Press, 1966).

changes in Egyptian political party structures will be
analyzed to determine the potential effects on levels of
political participation. The development of Egyptian politi-
cal party structures has been chosen as the focus of inves-
tigation, not because of any causal relationship on politi-
cal development, but rather as an arena in which to under-
stand authority structures and levels of political participa-
tion within the political culture. For the purposes of this
study, political participation is defined as any voluntary
individual or group action, successful or unsuccessful, in-
tended to influence the choice of public policy, the adminis-
tration of public affairs or the choice of political leaders
at any level of government. The definition is intentionally
broad, because Egyptian politics operates on a continuum
ranging from formal institutional frameworks to the informal
and extra-legal extreme. This study demonstrates that the
most meaningful type of participation in determining "who
gets what, when and how" in Egypt is that type of participa-
tion referred to as interpersonal relationships and clientelism
While the party structures have played a minimal role in
policy making, they have enhanced elite access and interest
articulation, especially at the subnational level.
The emphasis on political culture as a basis for analysis
is due to the relative non-applicability of current Western
theories of political development that fail to consider the
permanence of certain social and cultural factors in non-
Western states. While commentators of Middle Eastern politics
8

invariably caution the reader that things work differently
in the Middle East, they nonetheless fail to explain why
and usually proceed to apply Western political concepts on
a comparative basis without consideration of political cul-
ture. This problem is particularly evident in studies of
political participation and political parties in authori-
tarian non-Western states.
The most promising comparative theories of political
development seem to be those that emphasize the universal
. . . . . . . 2
aspects of political systems on an interdisciplinary basis.
Yet, even these studies by virtue of their universal nature
can only be of limited value when applied to political
3development within individual states. A secondary conten-
tion of this study is that only by applying the concept of
political culture to the broadly defined variables of Western
political development theory can the distance between macro-
level comparative theories and micro-level case studies be
4bridged.
2These theorists include members of the Committee on Com-
parative Politics of the Social Science Research Council whose
works have been published since 1963 in Princeton University's
Studies in Political Development series and contributors to
the Little, Brown and Company's series on comparative politics
under the editorship of Gabriel Almond.
3For a critique of development theory, see Richard Sand-
brook, "The Crisis in Political Development Theory," Journal
of Development Studies 12 (January, 1976): 165-185.
4For a similar opinion, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Political
Culture Approach to the Middle East," International Journal
of Middle East Studies, 8 (January, 1977) : 4 3-6 3.

Most studies of political development in authoritarian
states are primarily concerned with charismatic leadership
and political elites at the national level. With few excep-
tions, political parties are analyzed in terms of their
utility to the regime for purposes of spreading ideology,
legitimizing the leadership and mobilizing resources for
attaining the regime's goals of modernization.
The term "political culture" as used in this study is
derived from Gabriel Almond's observation that "every politi-
cal system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientation
to political actions" [Almond 1956], Almond's initial con-
cept has been refined by Lucian Pye, Sidney Verba, Leonard
Binder and others of the Committee on Comparative Politics
of the Social Science Research Council to "consist of the
system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values
which defines the situation in which political action takes
place" [Pye and Verba 1965, p. 513] . By encompassing both
the political ideals and operating norms (rules of the game)
of both leaders and citizenry, political culture is more
inclusive than such terms as political style or operational
code, and has widely replaced notions of national character,
modal personality, etc. Viewed in such a manner, political
culture is a system of political control which regulates
patterns of association and influence. To establish an
appropriate analytical framework and an adequate understanding
of the traditional political culture, a synthesis of
10

interdisciplinary source data including works on cultural
and social anthropology, sociology, Islamic studies, social
psychology and political history is presented. It is evi-
dent that in any modernizing state such as Egypt several
"political cultures" may exist at the same time. The con-
ceptualization applied in this study is designed to account
for these divergent political influences in terms of their
capacity to influence the regime, and the regime's capacity
to integrate divergent interests through such means as





A. THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL CULTURE
Political culture, like the general cultural system which
it reflects, is transmitted through political socialization.
Political-cultural values are gradually internalized within
the society and political behavior is largely reflective of
these learned values, despite the forces of political coer-
cion and centralized power. In this sense, political culture
is the psychological dimension of the political system. It
refers to those values, beliefs, attitudes and skills that
are current in the entire population (mass political culture)
,
as well as to those special propensities to attitudes and
behavior that are found within certain elements of the society
(political subcultures) . As traditional societies are con-
fronted with the forces of social change, cultural conflict
and modernization, the political values of various elements
within the society are altered. This process affects the
establishment of certain subcultures, the most notable being
the modernizing elite.
In many developing states, the modernizing elite have
emerged as the ruling elite and have promoted their own par-
ticular orientation to politics in order to legitimize their
leadership. Halpern viewed the political party as a means to
create a viable political culture by binding together charisma,
organization, ideology and accountability [Halpern 1963].
12

These forces combine to a greater or lesser extent to form
a complex symbolic system which becomes the political cul-
ture of the ruling elite. Political culture is shared,
although not uniformly, and it functions as both a product
and determinant of the political system. In authoritarian
states or states in which the political culture could best
be typified as parochial or subject (as opposed to partici-
pant)
,
the political system emphasizes not only basic beliefs,
but also a system of internal behavioral controls that deter-
mine patterns of political interaction. Patterns of social
trust or distrust on the personal and group level are signi-
ficant factors for political interaction in that they affect
conceptions of authority and collective identity. The politi-
cal culture approach is particularly applicable to the study
of Egyptian political development because of the non-insti-
tutional nature of Egyptian politics, pertinent social,
psychological and religious influences prevalent within the
society's traditional orientation to authority, and the cen-
trality of informal groups to the political process.
The analytical approach of this study incorporates other
instructive but not necessarily systematic or complete methods
of analysis - charismatic leadership, patron-client analysis,
institutional analysis, etc., - by determining their appli-
cability to Egypt's political culture. The significance of
these approaches to the understanding of Egyptian politics
is not that they describe Egyptian politics plausibly, but
13

rather that they emphasize political traits, ideals and
operating norms that have been internalized into the politi-
cal consciousness. The origin of these political ideals
is diverse: they result from Pharaonic/Coptic-Christian,
Arabic-Muslim and Western cultural influences. The intent
of this chapter is not to isolate the sources of Egypt's
culture or to define the complex process of cultural borrowing
and amalgamation that has taken place, but rather to provide
some indication of the politically significant factors that
have evolved.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Egyptian political history is characterized by a long
tradition of centralized administration. Due in part to
Egypt's geography, which has limited sedentary life along
two strait lines running parallel to the Mediterranean and the
Nile, the area has been historically easy to rule and admin-
ister. Egyptian society has always been "hydraulic" - depen-
dent on large-scale irrigation and flood control for its very
existence [Wittfogel 1957, p. 2f ] . Since time immemorial,
Egypt has had a strong centralized administration that con-
trolled the flood waters of the Nile and organized irrigation.
Government in Egypt, dating back to the Pharaonic period, has
been bureaucratically oriented and autocratic. The tradition
of autocratic centralized administration and the society's
dependence on the Nile provides some basis for understanding
Egyptian quietism, acceptance of de facto rulers and the
14

historic distrust of government. Although incomplete be-
cause there is no consideration given to the influence of
the Islamic concept of authority, the Lacoutures also empha-
size the impact of political geography:
The conqueror is usually received in Egypt with
open arms; defeat is 'nationalized' and as often as
not treated as a 'liberation'. This seeming oppor-
tunism does not mean that Egyptian patriotism is
of no accout . . . What is really involved is this
people's inner dynamism, which is less inclined to
rise against tyranny as the land and river make it
dependent on whoever controls the dykes and dams
[Lacoutures 1958, p. 12].
From the ancient rule of the pharaohs to the British-
influenced monarchies of this century, there is a marked
absence of institutional authority patterns. What has pre-
vailed instead has been a ruling caste of Mameluk, Ottoman,
Albanian, French and British influentials who established
and centralized their control largely through the patronage
of traditional leaders such as umad (village headmen) , ulama
(learned doctors of religion) and tribal shuyukh (leaders)
.
Authority was historically determined by land-based wealth
and access to central government elites. As a result, "the
leadership role that was institutionalized was that of
benevolent patron" [Springborg 1975, p. 85] . Even the reforms
of the 19th century which strengthened the authority of the
village umdah (headman) maintained this pattern. As Gabriel
Baer and others have noted, the village umad always repre-
sented the central government to the villagers, rather than
representing the villagers to the central government [Baer
15

1968, p. 119]. However, this does not mean that the umad
were government functionaries. The government needed the
umdah '
s
services and power as much as he needed recognition
and support. The recognition of an umdah '
s
authority, which
was based on family status, by the government was little more
than an affirmation of the traditional political culture.
One result of this centralism has been an almost complete
suppression of municipal enterprise in Egypt. This his-
torically centralized autocracy has accustomed Egyptians to
believe that they, either as individuals or as represented by
village or municipal leaders, had no function of articulating
interests. As Issawi noted, the belief is that only the cen-
tral government can initiate changes and the "rapacity of
the governors has led to a profound distrust of the government,
the effects of which are still visible" [Issawi 1963, p. 7]
.
This situation remained the same until Khedive Isma'il
formed a consultive Assembly of Notables in 1866 which was
largely composed of umad . While Binder interprets the assem-
bly as evidence of Egypt's participation crisis, it is evi-
dent that this group was by no means a representative body
and could be described more accurately as a counter-elite
of rural notables [Binder 1966, p. 222].
For a similar view, see Iliya F. Harik, The Political
Mobilization of Peasants: The Study of an Egyptian Community
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ., Press, 1974), pp. 50-56.
16

After the British occupation of Egypt in 18 82, a number
of advisory assemblies with limited influence continued to
meet, yet no political party emerged until 1907. The first
parties to emerge, including Mustafa Kamil's National Party
and Sa'd Zaghlul's Wafd Party, were primarily concerned with
ending the British occupation. These parties were actually
conspiratorial bodies, political "clubs" rather than parties,
and were largely comprised of urban leaders. The Wafd Party,
although not representative of all classes, was able to asso-
ciate itself with a growing national resentment of British
control. The official dissolution of the Ottoman Empire
after World War I and the prospect of independence from the
British spurred large-scale demonstrations, riots and assassina-
tions from 1919 to 1922, when the British unilaterally de-
clared the soveriegn independence of Egypt, subject to reten-
tion of certain British privileges, which in fact amounted
to continued British hegemony.
Egypt was thus established as a constitutional monarchy
under the Constitution of 1923. Zaghlul's Wafd Party won a
sweeping victory in the elections of 1924, but the rural
middle class strongly represented with the Wafd benefited
very little from its power. By contrast, a new class of
absentee landowners, merchants, financiers and urban pro-
fessionals were the direct beneficiaries of Wafd policies




Under the monarchy of King Fuad and his successor/ King
Farouk, there was a considerable struggle between the palace
and the Wafd. The new middle class became disenchanted with
the Wafd's inability to effect needed domestic reforms and
the British presence became more and more of an affront
[Halpern 1963, pp. 306-307] . Political alienation and
demonstrations in the cities became frequent, and elements
of the new middle class began to conspire against the system.
Aristocratic groups within the Wafd who had masterminded the
1922 compromise organized themselves into the Liberal Con-
stitutionalist Party, which never gained popular support, but
the king and the British supported their interests. Other
parties, such as the Saadist Party and the Union Party emerged,
and were used with the Liberal Constitutionalists as counter-
forces to the Wafd by the king. Some of these factions favored
the interests of the large landowners and urban industrialists
and others were intensely united against continued British
presence. The remainder of the Wafd Party was concerned about
maintaining its stature and power and aligned with the king.
Pre-revolutionary villages were bound politically and
economically to the king through personal ties with large
landowners [Ayrout 1963] . Ordinary villagers were economically
dependent on landlords, creditors and merchants. Villagers
had no political choices, since party competition for votes
was determined by the actual distribution of political in-
fluence in each community, and this influence was invariably
in the hands of the large landowners. The umad used personal
18

contacts to strengthen their positions against potential
local challengers and to obtain personal economic and
political advantages. At the same time, there developed
several conspiratorial organizatins including the Muslim
Brethren, the Communist Party, the Young Egypt Movement
and a clandestine revolutionary organization within the
military known as the Free Officers' Movement.
The pattern that emerged and was to prevail until the
1952 coup d'etat was the political competition of three
forces: the king, the Wafd and the British, with the
last holding ultimate authority. The king had twice dis-
solved the parliament in the 1920' s and in 1930 the con-
stitution was annulled. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on a
treaty to replace the unilateral British declaration of
1922 failed in 1924, 1927, and 1929, but the Italian con-
quest of Ethiopia in 1935 provided reason enough for
the British to make concessions. The elections of 1935
returned the Wafd to power and a defense agreement was
signed in 1936. The Treaty of 1936 hardly represented
the realization of all of Egypt's nationalist demands,
but it formally ended the occupation. British troops
would be withdrawn to the Suez and Sinai as Egypt's defense
capabilities improved; the capitulations would be removed;
The text and a recent view of Egyptian politics in the
inter-war years is found in Afaf al-Sayyid-Mar sot , Egypt '
s
Liberal Experiment: 1922-1936 (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal.
Press, 1977), pp. 253-263.
19

and control of its security forces was returned to Egypt
for the first time since 1882. While the British reserved
the right to reoccupy Egypt in case of outside attack, they
were responsive to the Wafd government and supported modest
reforms, such as opening the Military Academy to all classes.
With the outbreak of World War II, the British did not
hesitate to claim their wartime rights and more under the
1936 treaty. Egypt's refusal to declare war on the Axis
powers, and King Farouk's appointment of the pro-Italian Ali
Maher as prime minister caused the British to intervene more
than ever into Egypt's internal politics. The British forced
the expulsion of General Aziz Ali, the Army Chief of Staff,
due to his well-known German sympathies, and in 1942, forcibly
demanded the replacement of Maher with Wafdist leader Nahhas
in what has become known as the Abdin Palace coup . The
imposition of a Wafdist government by British military ulti-
matim dealt a final blow to Egyptian inspiration with the
Wafd.
After Egypt had received its independence in 1922 and
increasingly so in the 1930 's, the Wafd came to be associated
with large landowners and urban elites; it became the party
of the pashas . The basic pre-revolutionary historical experi-
ence was that the adoption of European liberal ideas and
political institutions was foreign to even those Egyptians
who participated in them. The establishment and functioning
of parliamentary assemblies and political parties demonstrated
20

these differences. Khedive Isma'il never intended to share
power with the initial Assembly of Notables that he organized.
Its function was at most consultative, much in the same way
a tribal shaikh (leader) was advised by his tribal council.
The development of political parties betrayed traditional
patterns of authority in attempting to act as loyal opposi-
tion. Growing nationalism and intense resentment of the
British were the only factors that attracted influential
support for the Wafd. Familial and personal ties among tra-
ditional elites were the means by which support for the Wafd
had been mobilized. It later became obvious that what was
thought to be widespread populist support was in fact uni-
fied traditional support.
C. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
In Egypt's transitional society, religion is still the
most important expression of basic values, attitudes and
assumptions found in its culture. This is not unique within
Egypt, because of the pervasive nature of Islam as a reli-
gious, social and political force. The centrality of Islam
to the political culture is in its effect on the formation of
attitudes toward authority and participation within the political
system. A corollary effect is due to the particular social
structure that was and is fostered in Islamic societies. The
•7
See the chapter on constitutionalism and democracy in
Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 28-54.
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role of the family as the basic unit of political socializa-
tion is not only manifest in its specific role of trans-
mitting political values, but also in the particular way
in which authority is expressed. As noted by Almond and
Verba , individuals tend to generalize from roles in family,
school, religion and job to the performance of political
roles [Almond and Verba 19 63, p. 323-330] . In Egypt, authori-
tarian and participatory expectations within the family are
especially pertinent to politics. Islam's strong dogmatic
religious authority (absoluteness of truth) and directive
authority (comprehensiveness of its regulations) have con-
ditioned the Muslim to unquestioning faith and obedience -
o
to submission to the will of god. It is only in Islam's
lack of institutional authority and its promotion of egali-
tarian values that Islam's authoritarian effects have been
mitigated by forces favorable to the development of a par-
ticipant political system. Egypt's long history of foreign
control and its exposure to Western political values have
reinforced both of these divergent forces of authoritarianism
and egalitarianism. In the practical application of politics,
the authoritarian influence has consistently been a much
more pervasive force.
Egyptian political culture can not be understood without
examining the psychological and societal factors that in large
o
See the analysis of Islam in terms of its dogmatic,
directive and institutional authority in Donald E. Smith,
Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1970): pp. 175-178, 267-272.
22

part dictate the arena in which politics takes place. De-
fining politics in its simplist terms makes this understanding
clearer: politics is simply who gets what, when and how
[Lasswell 1936] . Islam and kinship are the two factors that
have most affected and continue to affect the development of
political culture in Egypt.
A Morroe Berger once noted, "during thirteen hundred years
of Islamic civilization there was loyalty to family and reli-
gious community, perhaps even to profession or trade, but
certainly not to the political unit of city or state" [Berger
1962, p. 295] . In fact, during most of Egyptian Islamic his-
tory, there has been insufficient differentiation between
political and religious leadership to allow for the develop-
ment of civic or political loyalty.
The Qur'an and the hadith (the usages and sayings of the
prophet Mohammed) provide the basis for an Islamic politi-
cal philosophy containing two fundamental components: an
uncompromising doctrine of civic obedience and a precedent
for political consensus. Of particular importance for politi-
cal development and legitimacy within this philosophy is the
marked absence of an institutional basis for the society.
Sunnite Islamic traditions make no distinction between tem-
poral and religious authority. Since the khalifa (caliph)
derived his authority from Islam (Qur'an and sunnah ) , and
because the prophet directed that those who rule should not
be abused, no institutional checks on the absolute authority
23

of rulers developed [Lewy 1968, p. 3] . Modifications of
this concept of absolute authority developed based on the
Qur'anic principle of consultation ( shura ) , which has often
been interpreted as a basis for representative and participa-
9tory government. Despite the existence of advisory tribal
councils, the tribal shaikh's authority was never shared.
In traditional Islamic society, there was no effort to demand
active participation, despite the tendency for tribes to
"invariably view central authority as an alien force" [Khadduri
1970, p. 47]. The authoritarian influences in Islamic doc-
trine, reinforced by centuries of life under authoritarian
family and political rule, provide the basis for understanding
the authoritarian nature of the Arab personality [Berger 1962,
pp. 154-185] . Contrarily, the docility of the Egyptian fellah
(peasant) indicates the existence of a modal personality.
These behavior patterns, despite arguments by some religious
apologists that Islam is inherently democratic, have shown
in practice that Islam has been an impediment to the develop-
ment of democratic institutions. The concept of consultation
was never institutionally developed into anything more than
the political use of traditional religious i jma
'
(consensus)
into acquiescent agreement. The implications for political
development within a culture that promotes authoritarian
9For example, see Qur ' an , XLII, 36.
Cf. Humanyun Kabir, Science, Democracy and Islam (London
Oxford Press, 1955), chap. 1-2.
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leadership and an apolitical or politically apathetic citi-
zenry are extremely pessimistic. The post-revolutionary
Egyptian attempt to mobilize a politically apathetic citi-
zenry has been limited by the regime's reluctance to relin-
quish effective power. Egypt's modernizing leaders have
repeatedly "invited criticism and debate, but the invitation
has always been prefaced with the warning that the system
will not countenance rivals" [Holt 1968, p. 386]
.
The most promising explanation of why Egyptian leaders
cannot accept opposition and why the citizenry acquiesces
is the psychological view that Egyptians internalize the
role of the father and the mother in their personal relation-
ships [Pye and Verba 1965, pp. 408-411] . The father domin-
ates the family and his success is measured in terms of main-
taining the prestige and status of the family; the mother
submits to authority and is not the guardian of the family's
prestige, but rather its points of greatest vulnerability.
The ambivalence in roles is intertwined with the concept of
"honor and shame," which posits that, the moral aim of Arabs
is the preservation of their honor, which is dependent upon
12how other Arabs see them. This dependence makes them
outwardly-oriented and largely conforming, which affects
For an excellent discussion of the participation crisis,
see Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the
Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences , pp. 159-204
See discussion of this concept in J. G. Peristiany, ed.
,




their orientation toward politics significantly. The social
anthropologist Hamad Ammar identified a prevailing Egyptian
personality type, which he called the " fahlawi personality"
[Ammar 1954] . The personality type is characterized by quick
adaptability to the decrees of authority figures, resulting
in a preoccupation with untruth, and a series of psychologi-
cal complexes. Raphael Patai distorts this theme to the
extent where the Arab is portrayed as an inhumane religious
fanatic, concerned with gaining power and authority, yet
unable to attain it because of shame and the imprecise nature
of the language [Patai 1973] . While the characteristics of
the Arab personality, especially honor and shame, are funda-
mental in understanding Egyptian political culture, the
13
political inferences are unclear and often overexaggerated.
Perhaps the most even analysis is that of Binder, who derives
the following bases for Egyptian political culture:
In the first place, the kind of society which
Egyptians want is one that reflects the virtues taught
in the family and one which understands the essence
of national community in family terms. Second, all
persons in positions of authority tend to be assimi-
lated to the role and character of the father. The
individual who finds hmiself in a position of authority
has already internalized the model of the father as a
goal to which maturation and achievement of adult
status will lead him, but he may find that the strate-
gies of the mother are more helpful in subordinate
roles. Third, equalitarian relations cannot be con-
ceived of outside a framework of keen rivalries.
Fourth, formalism and prestige are still rated higher
than achievement. Fifth, authority and power are
1 For a similar opinion, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab
Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), pp. 52-53.
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thought to be aspects of personality and not attributes
of certain roles. Sixth, matters of personal feelings,
social adjustments and sex are all associated with
the idea of shame. Seventh, sharing of confidences
and especially lifting the veil of secrecy from any
of the symbols of shame are grave and stupid mistakes
which can only weaken the individual in his social
dealings. [Pye and Verba 1965, pp. 410-411]
The previously stated premise emphasizing the importance
of Islam and kinship in the development of Egyptian politi-
cal culture does not discount the impact that such factors
of migration, urbanization, mass communications, industriali-
zation and education have on the development of political
culture in Egypt, but rather that the importance of these
factors of modernization is in how they affect kinship and
religion, and their associated authority patterns. Theories
associated with Karl Deutsch, Daniel Lerner and others
emphasizing the direct impact of these factors on political
participation are not applicable to the Middle East in gen-
14
eral, or to Egypt in particular.
Kinship can be characterized by four components:
patriarchal authority, patrilineal descent, patrilocal resi-
dence and preferred kin-group endogamy. The kinship ties
among family members are extensive and produce a network of
social relations that directly affect Egyptian politics at
the national and subnational level. In the basic family unit
14See Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review 55 (September,
1961): 493-514 and Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional
Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958).
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the father is the authority figure and within his extended
family or clan there is an equally clear relationship with
the traditional shaikh . The often quoted Arab statement,
"my brother and I against my cousin; my cousin and I against
the stranger," accurately explains the prominence of family
15in social and political relationships even today. Studies
of Egyptian politics at national and subnational levels alike
indicate that politicians manipulate the lineage-marriage
system to obtain political support, socioeconomic security
and derived status. With a proper understanding of kinship,
the propensity for nepotism among Egyptians can be viewed as
a natural, moral and socially correct obligation. A second
and related basic concept of Egyptian social and political
relationships is the predominance of family loyalties based
on the personal relationships developed between different
17family leaders. Since these loyalties are renewed and often
15For a development of this theme, see Malcolm Kerr,
"Arab Radical Notions of Democracy," in Saint Antony '
s
Papers, No. 16; Middle Eastern Affairs , ed. by Albert
Hoiirani (London : Butler and Tanner, I~963) .
Henry Rosenfeld, "An Overview and Critique of the
Literature on Rural Political and Social Change," in Rural
Politics and Social Change in the Middle East , ed. by Richard
Antoun and Iliya F. Harik (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1972), pp. 72-73 and Robert Springborg, "Patterns of
Association in the Egyptian Political Elite," in Political
Elites in the Middle East , ed. by George Lenczowski (Washing-
ton! AEI, 1975) , pp. 83-106.
Binder identifies these relationships as "family sets."
See Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political
Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 81-91.
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changed for reasons of economic or political expediency,
18Egyptian politics becomes factionalized.
Because of this factionalization and the impact of the
factors of modernization, family prestige and status have
been affected. The concept of family as the sole basis for
analysis of Egyptian politics, even at the village level,
is no longer adequate. One approach developed by Richard
Antoun has been expanded for the purposes of this study to
explain political participation at national and subnational
level [Antoun and Harik 1972, pp. 118-162] . The following
modified hypothesis explains how various other factors per-
tinent to political competition and participation affect
political culture:
The level and type of political participation in
Egyptian politics is critically influenced by the
existence of a political community of social con-
trol, the intensity of its activity and the location
of its boundaries.
The particular usage of the term "political community" is
defined as that area within which there is competition for
control of key institutions. For example, at local level,
the community would be those villages that have village coun-
19
cils, agricultural cooperative boards, combined units, etc.
18For a historical explanation of factionalism, see
Manfred Halpern, Politics of Social Change in the Middle
East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1963)
,
pp. 18-19.
19Since 1960, smaller villages often come under the adminis-
tration of a larger village where such institutions are located
These villages are subordinate to kism (county seats) which are
subordinate to one of 26 governorates . See Mohammed Nassouhy,
"Local Autonomy under National Planning: The Egyptian Experi-
ence." Ph.D. dis., Univ. of S. Calif., 1965.
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The term "social control" refers to those formal and
informal institutions that internalize and conform members
of the political community to local norms. The use of the
term "boundaries" is included to distinguish those areas where
outside influences affect the competition, such as the posi-
tion of the army affecting a national decision regarding
domestic politics or a national development program affecting
village politics.
Within this framework the effect of the modernization
factors on kinship and subsequently on the political culture
become more understandable. The impact of education perhaps
more than any other factor of modernization has affected the
status of traditional families. In a detailed case study of
the village of Kafr el-Elow, Fakhouri notes that the number
of university educated men within a hamula or clan has become
important in village politics because "education has replaced
the size of the clan as a determinant of family status and
prestige" [Fakhouri 1972, p. 119]. While Fakhouri ' s analysis
appears correct for Kafr el-Elow, it may not be so in other
villages because of a difference in social control. For
example, a study of small villages in the governorate of
Beni Suef by Hassan indicated that despite the land reforms
of the 1950s and 1960s, which altered the status of many
umad , and the abolishment of the traditional village govern-
ment to include the position of umdah , the same individual




family was found to control 800 afdina (one feddan equals
1.04 acres) of land and eight of the ten members of the
village council were members of his hamula. Another detailed
study of a village of 6,000 near Damanhur in Beheira Governor-
ate indicated that the Samad family who controlled the village
for over 100 years had lost all influence as did many other
traditional leaders in the village, yet education did not
appear to be a factor [Harik 1974]
.
As in other developing nations, the impact of education
on political development in Egypt is largely a function of
the expanded social and economic roles of university gradu-
ates. The educational system has also provided Egypt with
a sort of cultural dichotomy. The traditional element in
this dichotomy is the Islamic educational system which in-
cluded the elementary Qur'an memorizing school ( kuttab )
,
the mosque school (madrasah ) and the ancient university of
Al-Azhar, whose students are graduated as ' ulama 1 . Modern
secular education which began during the Mohammed Ali period
is the second element. As Kerr's analysis of education and
political development in Egypt indicates, modern secular
educational measures did not supplant traditional learning,
but rather produced cultural ambivalence within intellectual
circles:
A considerable number of students from the tradi-
tional system, however, found their way into the
modern one by being sent to Europe or enrolling in
one of the higher professional or technical schools
in Egypt. A number of such persons, hybrid products
of two contrasting cultural traditions, have made
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interesting contributions to the intellectual and
political life of Egypt over the last century, reflect-
ing the tensions and conflicts of the two traditions
in a manner that reveals something of the complexity
of present-day political and social attitudes that
are sometimes encountered among educated Egyptians.
Mohammed Abduh and Sa'd Zaghlul are perhaps the best
known past figures to represent this cultural ambiva-
lence to the outside world; within Egypt such types
are commonplace [Kerr 1965, p. 171]
.
Formal education is regarded as a means of social and
economic mobility and it has been specifically connected with
the notion of equality and opportunity that has been actively
promoted by the post-revolutionary ruling elite. Mass educa-
tion which began in the 1950s has contributed to the unifica-
tion of cultural life by reducing the number of students
attending foreign schools [Kerr 1965, p. 183]. The "Egyptiani-
zation" of French and British schools in 1956 and the nationali-
zation of all foreign schools in 1962 has no doubt enhanced
cultural unification, but a cultural gap still remains between
20
the graduates of Al-Azhar and those of modern secular schools.
This gap continues to exist despite government efforts in the
19 60s to modernize the longstanding curriculum of Al-Azhar.
There is certainly no consensus even among university edu-
cated persons in Egypt that Islamic culture is being made
obsolete by modern or secular culture. Apologetics who insist
that there is no conflict between Islamic heritage and the
20Despite the usage "modern schools," educational prac-
tices continue to emphasize the authority of the teacher,
formal curricula, discipline, rote learning and routine.
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modern advocates of science, statutory law, democracy and
socialism have not convinced many segments of the population.
Such arguments have made it more difficult for the ruling
elite to look forward and outward rather than backward and
inward. The cultural attainments of both Pharaonic Egypt
and the Islamic Empires during their eras of ascendency were
remarkable, and these legacies are a source of confidence
and pride. However, the decline of these empires and
Egypt's relatively decadent position in today's world
also constitute social and psychological burdens.
Education makes Egyptian students more aware of their
heritage, enhances their self-conscious dignity and their
economic and social aspirations. The inability of many gradu-
ates to find economically and professionally satisfactory
jobs has made university students and graduates an increasingly
revolutionary force. Student demonstrations and political
agitation became much more intense since World War II to the
extent that both Nasir and Sadat have resorted to the sta-
tioning of troops on university campuses. Nasir *s so-called
"cultural revolution" was more accurately an attempt to
mobilize students to aspire to the modernizing goals of the
regime through the educational system. Daniel Lerner has
described a similar use of the communications media to attempt
to raise the productive capacity of the Egyptian masses
through political indoctrination while simultaneously attempt-
ing to limit the undesirable political consequences of mass
social consciousness [Lerner 1958, p. 251].
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A content analysis of Egyptian textbooks which were re-
vised in 1958 and 1959 provides an example of the extent to
which the regime used education as a means of political
socialization
:
Socialism is articulated as a Muslim theory of
socialism. The head of state is described as one respon-
sible for the maintenance of social justice and civil
order; he appoints and directs high administrators,
directs the economy and forms foreign policy. The
people choose him and he should submit to consultation
( shura ) , but his power comes from Allah [Carre 1972,
pp. 536-543]
.
The presentation of the regime's political values in
Islamic terms continues to be a prevalent method of legiti-
mization. Article 19 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971
prescribes religious instruction in the public schools, and
its application specifically ties political and religious
education in the traditional Islamic sense. In the reli-
gious texts now used, 72 percent of the interpretative con-
tent is devoted to political and social matters [Borthwick
1979, p. 159 and Carre 1972, p. 536]. The success of using
the educational media to integrate intellectuals and masses
alike into the regime's particular political subculture is
very tentative unless the society realizes its goals of
economic and social mobility. As noted by most analysts
of Egyptian political development, the establishment of a
well integrated and progressive political culture is dependent
upon the regime's ability to successfully confront Egypt's
severe economic problems, which affect most social and
political questions in Egypt.
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Education has certainly increased the social mobility and
political awareness of Egyptians of peasant origin and pro-
vided a catalyst to the influence of the middle class or what
Binder has called the "political class." Another aspect of
education has been the formation and influence of educational
cliques, especially at national level. A dufaa refers to a
group within a graduating class from a university, technical
or military school that generally studied the same subject
[Springborg 1975, p. 97]. Springborg's study of political
elites indicates that dufaa members develop strong loyalties,
and that the dufaa provides a means of recruitment into pre-
ferred government jobs. Since the majority of the political
elites are recruited from the military or public sector, the
dufaa is vital for access to the political elite. For gradu-
ates lacking family influence, the dufaa provides a means of
derived influence. The most apparently successful dufaa was
that of the original Free Officers formed at the Military
Academy in Cairo in 1940, which included Nasir, Sadat and
nine others, who later jointly seized power in July 1952 and
21formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
.
Another even stronger affiliation group known as a shilla
is prominent in Egyptian society and consists of a small
group of friends who cooperate with each other for attainment
of mutual goals, especially those related to career
21
The Free Officers' dufaa is explained in R. Hrair
Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership (Albany: Univ,




enhancement. The shilla provides relatively permanent
loyalties as opposed to temporary factions and alliances,
and can arise from associates within formal organizations,
dufaa , occupational groups or families. Shilal may form the
basis for large political alliances since each member of a
shilla may contribute his clientage network and family con-
nections to the alliance [Springborg 1975, pp. 99-104].
These affiliations or groups largely integrate influen-
tial along horizontal lines, leaving no organizational
basis for vertical loyalties [Moore 1974] . Yet, given the
prominence of personal relationship, it is natural that ver-
tical alliances would be made on a personal basis of patron
to client. Dekmejian's study of national political leader-
ship under Nasir and alliances between the RCC and other
shilal within the military and the bureaucracy provides a
firm basis for existence of a network of patron-client rela-
tionships integrated along vertical lines [Dekmejian 1971] .
Springborg' s study of elites indicates that clientelism also
exists at subnational level and cites examples at municipal
level. In fact, he states, "the degree of integration and
stable community politics achieved in Egypt is due largely
to patron-client relationships . . . vertical loyalties in
informal authority structures provide Egyptian urban politics
with an adequate functional substitute" [Springborg 1975, p. 90
2 2
Bureaucratic shilal are discussed in Springborg,
Political Elites, pp. 99-104.
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Since the patron-client relationships affect the influence
of subordinate shilal , the maintenance of strong patronage
is more important politically. Formal and informal organi-
zations and institutions such as the Peoples ' Assembly and
political parties provide an arena for personal relation-
ships and facilitate communication between clientage networks.
The ultimate step in verifying alliances and clientage is
still inter-family marriage. Sadat's brother-in-law, Mahmoud
Abu Wafia, was appointed to major party positions within the
Arab Socialist Union. The marriage of Sadat's daughter into
the aristocratic Osman family has verified another associa-
tion. Industrialist Osman Ahmad Osman has been a close
political confidant of Sadat and a major benefactor of Sadat's
economic liberalization (infitah) policies. Amal Osman has
been appointed to a cabinet ministry [Bill and Leiden 1979,
p. 232]
.
President Sadat's strong loyalties with Sayyid Marei,
previous Secretary-General of the ASU and Speaker of the
Peoples' Assembly, is understandable since Sadat's other
daughter is married to Marei's son. This relationship was
strengthened in 1975 when a constitutional amendment intro-
duced by Sadat provided that the speaker of the assembly
replace the president in case of death or resignation.
Springborg's case study of the Marei family in the pre-
revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods provides a good
example of the persistence of political influence based on
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family ownership of land and Sayyid Marei's personal rela-
23tionship with both Nasir and Sadat. A similar ethnographic
study of the Delta region by Robert Fernea indicates that
the Delta's economic importance to the central government
has caused a great deal of central government interest in
the politics of most of these villages, again with a limiting
effect on family-based village influences [Fernea 1972,
pp. 75-102]
.
Few generalizations can be made about village politics,
yet available studies do provide enough confirming data to
support some preliminary findings. The social and political
structure of small non-industrialized villages of about 10,000
or less is likely to be based on a limited number of hamula .
The village councils and political party councils in these
villages tend to reflect the relative power and influence of
the competing families. In his study of rural institutions
in 1974, Myafield found that in small villages the "concept
of competing candidates vying for ten positions on the local
ASU Committee of Ten was still alien to a society where
family structure largely determines leadership positions"
[Mayfield 1974, p. 115] . In these villages, family elders




See Robert Springborg, Ties That Bind , 1974 and "Sayed
Bey Marei and Political Clientelism in Egypt," Comparative
Political Studies 12 (October 1979): 259-288.
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Other factors that have affected kinship and altered
the political culture within Egyptian villages and munici-
palities are migration, urbanization and industrialization.
Of these factors, migration appears to have the least effect
on changes in political participation, since the majority
of migrants are unskilled workers with a comparatively low
evel of political awareness. Most migrants settle with
others of the same village and locate employment through them
when possible; however, the migrant community lacks the
prestige and familial hierarchy of the village [Binder 1969,
p. 416] . Available data indicates that about 40 percent of
the unskilled migrants in cities are members of their village
migrant associations, but these associations rarely involve
themselves in municipal politics [Peterson 1971 and Zeid
1979] .
The simultaneous industrialization and urbanization of
traditional villages has a more significant role. Fakhouri 's
case study of Kafr el-Elow, which he describes as an "urban-
industrialized village with a folk-peasant base," provides
some notable insights since the village is located near
Egypt's industrial complex at Helwan, and the village has
six identifiable hamula [Fakhouri 1972] . Three general
effects were noted:
First, that the village's industrial occupation struc-
ture has a large percentage of skilled workers and
professionals, and this segment and the youth are
interested and concerned with politics; secondly, that
kinship ties have been weakened but still exist; and
thirdly, that villagers have adapted their behavior to
reduce conflict between traditional and modern life
styles [Fakhouri 1972, pp. 124-125].
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Family influence is slowly giving way to identification
with various voluntary associations. Moore has argued that
urban society is actually structured by these associations,
even though they have not exhibited autonomous political
influence [Moore 1974]. Studies of professional syndicates,
voluntary religious associations and benevolent societies
demonstrate that the leadership of many of these associations
have been co-opted into the clientage system of the regime.
The linkage of these associations to the regime is usually
through personal relationships with members of various bureau-
cratic agencies [Reid 1974 and Springborg 1978]. Binder's
analysis of the rural elite demonstrates that there is also
a family connection between the leadership of urban voluntary
associations, especially professional syndicates, and the
traditional rural elite [Binder 1978, p. 104], The pattern
that is emerging in urban areas is one in which the political
impact of deteriorating family influences is moderated by
family linkages between urban and rural elites. Since more
members of Egypt's rural elite families are seeking pro-
fessional and government careers, this moderating influence
should continue.
D. POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
Egypt's mass political culture derives from a synthesis
of Pharaonic/Coptic-Christian, Arabaic-Muslim and Western
influences and can be characterized by several common fea-
tures, some of which are curiously divergent and inconsistent
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Mayfield and others have noted that Egypt's political culture
is fragmented between traditional and modern concepts of
authority and political action [Mayfield 1971] . While the
existence of both traditional and modern influences is cer-
tainly to be expected in any transitional state, Egypt's
political culture is further fragmented within both the tra-
ditional and modern spheres. It has already been shown
that the average Egyptian has internalized certain values or
orientations to politics that are contradcitory , and that
there is evidence of a basic modal personality. These
"dualities" appear to be equally apparent when analyzing
various features of the Egyptian political culture. Dessouki
has identified three basic features: (1) idealization of the
past; (2) privatism, skepticism and self-concern; and (3)
acceptance of a centralized and authoritarian administration
[Dessouki 1971]
.
The idealization of the past is best described by von
Grunebaum's concept of cultural classicism:
(1) The past (or merely an alien) phase of cultural
development is recognized as a complete and perfect
realization of human potentialities.
(2) This realization is appropriated as a legitimate
inheritance or possession.
(3) The possibility is admitted that the present may
be recast in terms of past perfection.
(4) The aspiration of the past is accepted as exemplary
and as binding on the present [von Grunebaum 1962,
p. 72]
.
For the Egyptian and many Muslims, history is consulted
to yield the glories of the past which may be taken as a
warranty for a similarly glorious future [Chejne 1960] . The
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past, especially the period of the orthodox caliphate (632
A.D. - 661 A.D.) is seen as an image of what the world
should be [Hourani 1962, p. 8]. However, the Egyptian also
views Pharaonic/Coptic history as a source of pride, honor
and self-consciousness. Many words, festivals, and social
and religious practices have survived from the Pharaonic
period and are shared by both Muslims and Copts [Lane 1842]
.
The Egyptian is thus amenable to the themes of both the
Pharaonic/Coptic and the Islamic past.
Nasir alternated between the themes of Egyptianism and
Arabism during his regime. The 1952 coup d'etat and the
eventual evacuation of the British were nationalist, "Egyptian"
victories. Nasir later evoked the Arab nature of Egypt in
Islamic terms. Yet, the Egyptian identification was not
abandoned during the period of Arabism as evidenced by
Egypt's "natural role" as leader of the Arab Nation. Egypt's
expanded role in the ill-fated union with Syria was a major
cause for its demise. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Nasir
effected a subtle shift from Arabism back to Egyptian nation-
alism and re-opened the debate on the "Egyptian personality"
[Dekmejian 1971, p. 265]. Since 1973, Sadat has emphasized
The writings of patrons of Egyptian nationalism regained
their credibility. See Tawfiq al-Hakim, Under the Sun of
Thought (Cairo: 1938); 'Awdat al Wa '
i
(Return of Awareness)
(Beirut, 1974); and Taha Husayn, The Future of Culture in
Egypt (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies,
1954). See also Mirrit Boutros Ghali, "The Egyptian National
Consciousness," Middle East Journal 32 (Winter 1978): 59-77.
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Egyptianism to legitimize a foreign policy that became
increasingly independent of Arabism. To legitimize this
shift, the regime has emphasized that Egyptian nationalism
is a political and cultural force, while Egypt's identifica-
tion with Arabism is undeniable but strictly cultural. The
duality that is apparent is one between an identification with
Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism as the political
focus of national identity. It is instructive to note that
both Nasir and Sadat have relied upon the masses' idealiza-
tion of the Islamic past to promote things modern. New
programs and policies continue to be introduced and promoted
in Islamic terms, carefully defining their bases in the
Islamic past, and often legitimized through the issuance
of a supportive fatwa.
The basic Islamic identification of Egypt is so pervasive
that no political leader would dare challenge it directly.
The response of both Nasir and Sadat to simultaneous forces
of fundamentalism and secularism has been to tighten state
25
control of religion and to promote "modernist Islam."
Modernism attempts to reaffirm and re-evaluate the signifi-
cance of the Qur'an, hadith, and the shari 'ah for modern life,
and to stress the underlying concepts of Islamic jurisprudence
25
The modernist approach is best presented in the writings
of Mohammed Abduh, especially his Risalat al-Tawhid (Unity
and Oneness of God). See the discussion of Abduh ' s doctrines
in Charles W. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (New York:
Russell, 1968), pp. 104-176.
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including maslaha (the public good) and ijtihad (independent
juristic judgment) [Humphreys 1979] . By bringing the awqaf
,
shari'ah courts, voluntary religious associations and Al-Azhar
under state control, Nasir sought to espouse a version of
Islam that would appeal to both the conservative masses and
the religious middle class, and legitimize his goals of
modernization [Berger 1970] . By expanding state control in
the name of religion, Nasir was also intent on undercutting
the Muslim Brethren. Sadat has promoted a similar policy
of control and deference to religion. The Constitution of
1971 states that "Islam is the religion of the state" and
that the "principles of the Islamic shari 'ah are a major
source of legislation" [Flanz and Blaustein 1972, Art. 2].
Sadat has taken measures to implement a law promulgated in
1960 which places Egypt's 4,000 public mosques, 15,000 pri-
vate mosques and thousands of zawiyah (prayer rooms) under
the administration of the government controlled Ministry of
Awqaf [Borthwick 1979, p. 157]. Sadat's slogan that "Egypt
must rely on faith and science" is indicative not only of
his preference for modernist Islam, but also of his realiza-
tion that there can be no break in Egypt's religious-political
synthesis. The legitimacy of the state, the identity of
the Egyptian nation and the character of the citizenry are
firmly based in Islam. The growth of religious sentiment
among Muslims and Copts, especially among the youth, and the
growth of Sufi brotherhoods in Egypt confirms religion's
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continued centrality in Egyptian political culture [Borthwick
1979, Brodin 1978, and Gilsenan 1973].
Dessouki's second and third features of Egyptian mass
political culture are themselves inconsistent and contra-
dictory. Privatism, skepticism and self-concern depict the
average Egyptian's disregard for public and official matters.
Government is viewed as illegitimately maintained by power
and force. Centuries of misrule and oppression are kept alive
in the popular sayings of the people [Issawi 1963, pp. 6-9].
At the same time, government has an awesome quality, because
it has been the major source of organized social power and
no class or group outside the government possesses enough
strength to successfully threaten it. Consequently, behavior
has been characterized by political quietism and acceptance
of centralized and authoritarian de facto governments. These
values provide evidence for a cultural acceptance of a two-
class theory of Egyptian politics - one class that is in power
and one that is not. The make-up of these two segments of
Egyptian society and the nature and scope of their interaction
is particularly basic to understanding the political culture.
As previously noted, Egypt's rulers have centralized their
control largely through the patronage of traditional leaders
(umad , ulama and shuyukh ) and the relationship of the rulers
26
Kedourie and others argue that two-class theory or
Pareto ' s concept of elite and masses is ubiquitous in the
Middle East. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and
Other Middle Eastern Essays (London: Oxford, 1970) , p. J8~4
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and the traditional leaders was not without reciprocities.
The traditional leadership group functioned as intermediaries
of the government, brokers between the rulers and the masses.
As such, the central government was dependent upon the umdah
system.
The traditional leadership was thus part of the ruling
class, or what Mosca called the "second strata of the ruling
class" - the strata without which the leadership could not
27
rule [Meisel 1962, p. 217]. The clientage of the tradi-
tional leadership to the central government provided a ver-
tical and non-institutional basis of political control.
Traditional leaders solidified their political control through
the maintenance of long-established subordinate clientage
networks and horizontal linkages to the ulama and shuyukh
of other large land-owning families. The ambivalence between
acceptance and mistrust of government resulted in a political
system in which the acceptance of the government by the
masses was largely a measure of their acceptance of the
traditional leadership which represented the government to
the masses at the local level. Patron-client linkages between
the government and the umad and between the umad and the
fellahin were dependent on the patron's ability and willing-
ness to meet the reciprocal expectations of his clients, which
27
Binder's analysis of Egypt's rural elite empirically
demonstrates that the pre-revolutionary second-stratem has
not only maintained its influence, but has also been the




are inherent in any patronage system. Gabriel Baer's refu-
tation of the docility of the Egyptian fellahin is based on
instances in which such reciprocities were disregarded [Baer
1969, pp. 93-108] . Documented instances of political pro-
test by the masses, both urban and rural, demonstrate that
the masses are likely to resort to extra-legal activities
when certain fundamental aspects of their life are seriously
threatened. These aspects are limited to their strong iden-
tification with Islam, to any deterioration of their already
marginal standard of living and any threat to continued
Egyptian independence from a foreign power. It is likely
that the masses would react similarly to more peripheral
issues if presented as a threat to those fundamental con-
cerns, especially if such actions were supported by tradi-
tional leaders, heads of voluntary associations or a charis-
matic national leader such as Nasir.
The mass political culture, and the basically inconsis-
tent orientations to politics and authority which it includes,
have had a directive effect on the type of political system
and leadership that has evolved since the 19 52 coup d'etat .
The directive nature of Egypt's political culture is due to
the durability of values and behavioral norms that have proven
almost invulnerable to radical change. The non-institutional
nature of Egyptian politics with its proclivity for personal
patronage and ingroup-outgroup rivalry is more accurately
an internalized orientation to political action than a des-
cription of the post-revolutionary regime'. Despite Nasir 's
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success in eliminating the political power of a number of
large and powerful landowners through agrarian reform, his
efforts to undermine the umdah system by creating parallel
one-party and local government structures were largely
unsuccessful. The umdah system found itself reinforced as
the source of new elites for Nasir's enlarged military-
bureaucratic system and as a source of predictable authority
in rural Egypt when compared to the inconsequential and
ephemeral character of new government structures.
Nasir's authority and control was limited by the same
factor that restricted previous rulers. His control was
limited by the reciprocal relationship of the patronage
system. With the expansion of governmental structures, the
significance of the brokerage function of clients also ex-
pands to the extent that control through the patron-client
nexus alone is no longer possible [Lemarchand and Legg 1972,
p. 154]. Clients begin to operate at cross-purposes or at
least independently of formal institutional roles. Hori-
zontal associational ties ( shilal ) reinforce the traditional
means of security and mobility through familial or kinship
groups. As Moore's analysis of Egyptian shilal notes, the
shilla member eventually becomes his own man - not dependent
on any one patron, but rather on the system of interpersonal
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relationships [Moore 1977, p. 263]
.
2 8
Moore's contention is strongly supported by Robert




The limitation placed upon the authority of the Egyptian
leader by the political culture conceptually precludes a
true authoritarian or totalitarian political system. The
reciprocity of the patronage system relegates the would-be
authoritarian leader to the patrimonial category. Max
Weber's typology of the patrimonial ruler is one who rules
through an administrative structure which emerges as an
extension of the kinship group, so that administrators are
tied to the ruler through bonds of paternal authority. Access
to the person of the ruler determines influence and can be
obtained through direct interpersonal relations or through
an intermediary or series of intermediaries [Weber 194 7, pp.
341-358] . The Egyptian political system is more typically
a modern patrimonial system in which the post-revolutionary
regime has attempted to alter the political culture by trying
to mobilize the citizenry to support its goals of moderniza-
tion. The remaining sections of this study address the extent
to which Nasir and Sadat have been successful in attaining
these goals and the effect of their policies upon political
participation and elite access within the political culture.
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III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER NASIR
The conspiratorial grouping of nationalist officers known
as the Society of Free Officers originated sometime during
World War II and established regular meetings in 1944, but
became seriously organized into interlocking secret cells
only after 1949 [Sadat 1957, p. 38] . After the Arab defeat
in the 1948 Palestine War in a largely unorganized effort,
the mood in Egypt was violent but nationalistic. Popular
unrest was widespread, with a "total of forty-nine workers'
strikes in 1951 alone and several bloody peasant uprisings"
[Baker 1978, p. 27]. Guerrilla attacks against British forces
near Suez became more frequent, and in January 1952, the Bri-
tish surrounded a police station in Ismailia and demanded the
surrender of guerrilla forces; the post refused, resulting
in a massacre. The following day, Black Saturday, frenzied
mobs, supposedly led by the Muslim Brethren, burned the center
of Cairo, concentrating on British property and buildings
associated with foreign interests.
During the evening of 22-23 July 1952, the Free Officers
with troops under their command marched on the General Head-
quarters and seized control in an almost bloodless coup d'etat
The first of three stated goals was attained: (1) overthrow
of the monarchy; (2) reform the social and political system
by eliminating the power of the ancien regime of wealthy
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landowners and umad ; and (3) secure a final evacuation of
the British from Egypt.
From its inception the coup was elitist. Within the
military structure, the Free Officer movement was limited
to junior and mid-range officers and headed by a nucleus
of ten to fourteen officers. The inner core of officers
were linked by personal, non- institutional ties ( shilla ) and
each member had formed secondary groups of officers. Shortly
after seizing power, the revolutionary government endeavored
to remove the power of the ancien regime of landowners and
powerful influentials . To accomplish this stated goal of
the revolution, agrarian land reform was enacted and political
parties were banned in 1953. The expectation by the Free
Officers that the Egyptian people would rally behind the new
regime after the overthrow of the monarchy was not realized,
and the need to establish a firm basis of popular support
became obvious [Nasir 1955] . The Land Tenure System Law of
1952 placed a ceiling on landholdings over 200 afdina , re-
sulting in an estimated redistribution of only 150,000 afdina
29by the end of 1955. The major success of the agrarian re-
form was that it regulated the tenant-landlord relationship
and eventually established local cooperative structures with
peasant representation on advisory boards from village to
29Jame P. Mayfield, Local Institutions and Egyptian Rural
Development (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1974), p. 20. Authorized
land holdings were reduced to 100 afdina in 196 2 under the
provisions of the National Charter, and further reduced to
50 afdina in 1970.
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governorate level. The expectation that the distribution
of land to landless peasants would increase productivity and
solidify popular support was not realized.
A. THE LIBERATION RALLY AND THE NATIONAL UNION
The Liberation Rally was established in January of 1953
as a single-party structure to mobilize support for Nasir
immediately following his victory over the figurehead and
symbolic leader of the Revolution , General Naguib and his
Wafdist supporters. The Rally aimed at associating the
masses with the regime, which by now proclaimed a sweeping
revolution; it was also designed to create an alternative
to the disbanded political parties and the Muslim Brethren.
It served to support Nasir against Naguib and it was the
regime's main instrument in purging trade unions and stu-
dent associations of opposition [Dessouki 1978, p. 11].
The Rally was loosely organized, devoid of ideology and
required only an expression of loyalty to the RCC. The
Rally has been judged as a total failure at mobilizing
national popular support; however, the Rally may have had
30
a different effect at the local level.
Iliya Hariks * detailed case study of Shubra el-Gedida
provides evidence that the Liberation Rally acted as a
conduit for the development of a village counter-elite that
eventually succeeded in overthrowing the controlling Samad
Binder has argued that the failure of the Liberation





family in 1959 [Harik 1974, pp. 68-80] . By exposing the
Samad family's connections with the ancien regime , an opposi-
tion group with no previous experience with institutional
politics was able to control the new local party branch of
the Liberation Rally. While the party gave the opposition
leader, Mohammad Kura, no specific functions, it did estab-
lish his official prestige and facilitated his influence by
permitting official contact with governorate leaders. Kura
received support from the peasants serving on the cooperative
board and expanded his influence throughout the village and
in neighboring villages by forming personal contacts. The
effect of the Liberation Rally on political participation in
Shubrawas to significantly increase participation in the
recruitment of local leadership and secondly, to increase
the level of symbolic competition at village level.
The character of Nasir's Egypt in the early years of the
regime (1952-1955) was one of highly personal control through
the direct use of the military. The military, as a national
institution, became the new ruling elite. However, Nasir's
goals of modernization and the recognized need for political
mobilization to support the regime's development programs
somewhat moderated the direct role that the military played
31in the early years of the regime.
31The role of the military is discussed in Chapter V,
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The Constitution of 1956 provided for the establishment
32
of the National Union to replace the Liberation Rally.
The National Union was placed under the leadership of a party
executive committee which was comprised of three Free Offi-
cers. Firm restrictions were placed on participation at
national level by the executive committee, which was tasked
to review and approve all cnadidates for elections to the
newly constituted Peoples' Assembly. In preparation for the
initial election, 2,528 candidates were screened and almost
half were rejected [Dawisha 1976, p. 118] . Through this
process, previous affiliations between the regime and local
influentials were solidified [Harik 1973, p. 86] . The function
of the newly elected 350-member assembly proved to be little
more than ceremonial. Nasir stated that he relied on the
National Union "to get to know the problems of the masses
and to allow them to get in touch with the government and
33
ask for solutions to these problems." The use of the National
Union as a channel of communication proved no more successful
than its use as an organization for political mobilization.
At the subnational level, the contest for National Union
party leadership was to be determined by local party elections.
32For a text of Nasir' s decree establishing the National
Union in 1957, see Jean Vigneau, "The Ideology of the Egyptian
Revolution," in The Middle East in Transition , ed. by Walter
Z. Laqueur (New York: Praeger , 1958).
33British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of Weekly
Broadcasts: The Middle East, July 24, 1959, p. 28.
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The basic committee of the Union was to be a Committee of
Ten; the central party organization did not name, endorse or
screen candidates as was the practice at national level.
Harik's study of Shubra indicates that the future political
aspirations of the Samad and Kura blocs were determined by
the local elections held in July of 1959 [Harik 1974, p. 69].
The Kura bloc won a majority of six committee seats making
it possible for four of their allies to become municipal
councillors. Mohammed Kura was elected by the committee
to be a district delegate and eventually as a governorate
delegate. He was elected to the National Congress in 1960
as the Beheira Governorate representative, and his brother,
Sayyid Kura, was appointed mayor of Shubra by the Beheira
governor. Nasir's call for a special congress to be elected
in 1961 to discuss future political organizations resulted
in the confirmation of the Kura leadership, but also evidenced
the growing power of agrarian reform peasants headed by
Ali al-Shawi, a pesant and secretary of the agrarian reform
cooperative of Shubra. Mohammed Kura and Ali al-Shawi were
elected to represent the district at the special Peoples'
Congress. The Shubra experience indicates that the National
Union did provide local leaders with a means to influence
village-wide policy and to establish political contacts out-
side the community. The lack of effective centralized party
control and the failure of the national regime to provide
institutional power to the governorates allowed village
leadership to operate with relative autonomy.
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In those villages where the initial reforms of the Nasir
regime failed to effect the control of the village umdah or
wealthy landowners, the effect of the decentralized nature
of the National Union was dysfunctional. By providing the
traditional leader increased autonomy and a mechanism for
establishing new personal contacts at district and governorate
level, the Union in fact provided some new legitimacy and
solidified the traditional leader's position. If the pre-
viously discussed generalizations about village political
development are accurate, it is likely that the Shubra experi-
ence was typical only in those villages where early reforms
challenged the traditional leadership and provided the impetus
for development of an opposition bloc. Harik's conclusion
that "members of the local party branch in Subra enjoyed the
freedom to select their own officers and to form competing
political groups within the organization" should not be
interpreted as evidence of grass roots democracy, but rather
within the context of the political culture presented. The
change in effective leadership was actually from the Samad
family to the Kura family. While the party structure and
the agrarian cooperative structure provided the arena, the
change was effected through personal and family relationships
and alliances. Rather than the reforms creating a change in
political culture with implications for increased participa-
tion, it would be more accurate to posit that the traditional
political culture, operating in the arena of the imposed
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one-party structure, directed a change in leadership since
the Samad family lost its perceived status and authority
due to its close association with the ancien regime . The
successful use of the party structure by the Kuras improved
the prestige of the public office-holder and party official.
The lack of detailed planning, ideology and control at
governorate level and below caused the National Union, like
its predecessor , to be ineffective at mobilizing support.
Given Egypt's proclivity for personal relationships and
affiliations, it is likely that an almost direct link exists
from the national leadership to the village despite the
presence of a large and cumbersome bureaucracy and the party
structure. The most significant effect of the National Union
and the assembly upon the political culture was that it
provided a conduit for extended affiliations to be formed.
The lack of subnational party control allowed traditional
rural elites to continue to operate in relative autonomy.
A similar lack of centralized control was also apparent in
the local government structure.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The Constitution of 1956 provided for a new local govern-
ment with elected bodies, which was established four years
34later by Local Government Law No. 124 of 1960. The local
34 See Nassouhy, Local Autonomy , p. 20 3 and Mohammed A.
al-Araby, An Outline of Local Government in the United Arab
Republic (Cairo: Gov't Press, 1962).
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government system is an important variable in evaluating
political participation and the one-party system, because
of the multiplicity of function between the government and
the party and because the local government structure provides
for additional political representation at village level
and for its implementation of party policies.
Law 124 provides for provincial (governorate) councils
headed by governors appointed by the President of the Repub-
lic and for town and village councils comprised of elected,
35
selected and ex officio members. The Arab Socialist Union's
(ASU) Executive Committee elects a number of representatives
not to exceed ten from its own membership to the village coun-
cil. The village council also includes two members selected
by the Ministry of Local Government with the advice of the
governor and six ex officio members representing the Minis-
tries of Education, Health, Agriculture, Housing and Public
Utilities and Interior. The village council is presided
over by a mayor (chairman) who is appointed by the Ministry
of Local Government from among the members of the village
council with the consent of the local ASU.
While the practice of appointing ex officio and selected
members indicates a high degree of centralized control, the
35United Arab Republic, Presidential Decree of Law No.
124 of 1960 and Executive Regulations (Cairo: Gov't. Press,
1960) , pp. 6, 13, 19.
36
For a detailed discussion of the functions of Village
Councils, see Nassouhy, Local Autonomy , chap. 9.
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central government did not give governorates sufficient
power and responsibility to effectively limit local autonomy
[Heaphey 1966]. However, as Nassouhy points out, the governorates
do exercise effective authority in fiscal matters by re-
quiring that local councils submit budgets for approval.
The central government's failure to limit local autonomy
provides an example of the reciprocities inherent in the
patron-client relationship between national and subnational
elites. With the exception of certain large landowners,
Nasir's various measures to expand state control did not
eliminate the political and economic influence of the
umdah .
C. THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION
The secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in
1961 coincided with Nasir's adoption of a socialist ideology
and a growing realization for the need to expedite the
achievement of developmental goals through another mobiliza-
tion party. Under Nasir's direction, a preparatory committee
met to decide the representative formula for a Congress of
Popular Forces (special Peoples' Assembly) that would be
charged with developing a socialist charter. The Congress
of Popular Forces, based on an occupational or corporative
representation of 50 percent farmers and workers, met in
May of 1962 to review a draft national charter prepared by
Nasir. The National Charter was approved without amendment
and issued in December 1962. It declared that the Arab
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Socialist Union was to be the nation's single political
organization and reaffirmed official party supremacy over
the bureaucracy. The structure of the ASU contained two
innovations:
(1) Fifty percent of all seats within ASU committees
were filled with farmers or workers as defined
in the charter. This also included the Peoples'
Assembly.
(2) The charter provided for elected ASU basic units
in state-controlled enterprises, factories, minis-
tries and business firms [Antoun and Harik 1972,
p. 377] .
At national level, the new party consisted of an appointed
general secretariat and a supreme executive council. Nasir
continued to dictate national policy, which was implemented
through the cabinet and civil and party bureaucrats. The
party was loosely coordinated, and party officers at the
governorate level had little direct influence on party
organizations at the village level. Figure I depicts the
formal structure of the ASU from 1963 to 1965.
The effect of the new ASU at local level was first realized
during the elections of 1963. The number of seats on the
party committee had increased from ten to twenty; 50 percent
of the seats were restricted to farmers or workers. Harik 's
case study shows that these changes did affect the traditional
leadership. In Shubra, there were three slates and a number
of independents competing for party positions. The Kuras
won only eight seats, agrarian reform peasants won seven
seats and independents won five. Both Shawi and Kura ran





















Constituted but not convened: *
Direct line of authority : 7
Election by lower level :
^
Weak Authority Pattern : I I
Figure 1. The Arab Socialist Union
Structure, 1963 to 1965
four others, but due to their factional rivalries, Shawi
and Kura refused to run on the same slate which would have
assured their election. As Harik recounts, they were both
defeated [Harik 1974, p. 77].
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The short term effect of the ASU on political participa-
tion was to expand the influence of politically active
peasants and workers and to expand the level of their repre-
sentation in governmental organizations, state-controlled
enterprises, factories, business, and cooperative associa-
tions. However, the ASU's inability to motivate citizens
toward developmental national goals from 1962 to 1965 pro-
vided increasing evidence to Nasir that even the newly formed
ASU was ineffective. A series of nationalization decrees
were issued between 1960-1963 which extended government con-
trol over the economy, and several economic planning com-
mittees within the bureaucracy were established to direct
economic development.
Despite the official subservience of the bureaucracy to
the all three single-party organizations, the bureaucracy
flourished. Nasir expressed dissatisfaction with the grow-
ing independence of the bureaucracy, and he publicly attacked
influential bureaucratic leaders during a speech before the
Peoples* Assembly in March 1964, emphasizing that he "would
not allow them to imagine themselves as a new class inheriting
the privileges of the old capitalists" [Antoun and Harik
1972, pp. 302-303] . The role of "watchdog over the bureaucracy"
assigned to the ASU in 1965 expressed Nasir' s concern over
37For a detailed discussion of the nationalization decrees
and a list of families affected, see Anwar Abdel Malek,





the influence of the bureaucratic elite. Local Government
Law 124, for example, vastly increased the penetration and
influence of several bureaucratic agencies by directing its
representatives to be ex officio and voting members of
village councils.
Nasir directed that the ASU be revitalized in 1965 by
involving the citizenry in active support of the regime's
goals of modernization and the regime's official ideology.
To accomplish this mobilization, former Prime Minister Ali
Sabri, a hard-line leftist, was appointed Secretary-General
of the ASU. Sabri established a hierarchy of authority
within the party by establishing a system of appointing party
cadre and ending the direct elections of ASU party leaders
at subnational level. The mobilization program created party
controlled "leadership groups" at subnational level, which
challenged local governmental leadership and established four
local activities: political education through new district-
level socialist training institutes, supervision of local
ASU corporate basic units and committees, community develop-
ment self-help projects, and the creation of ASU Youth
Organizations [Harik 1974, pp. 84-100].
The previously constituted Committee of Twenty at village
level was not abolished but rather bypassed by the new re-
form. The leadership group was created to coordinate various
organizations and factions in the community with ASU repre-
sentation and to effect developmental projects desired by
the regime. Normally, the leadership group consisted of the
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mayor, village doctor, village agronomist and villagers
with leadership potential; the leadership group chairman
was usually selected from village workers or cultivators,
but not from village officials [Antoun and Harik 1972, p. 307].
Again, contrary to announced objectives, the new ASU form
increased bureaucratic influence by providing its subnational
representatives with an expanded area of official involvement.
Case studies of Kafr el-Elow, Shubra and other villages
indicate that the mobilization drive undermined the influence
of traditional leaders. In Beheira Province, the First Secre-
tary of the Executive Bureau undercut village opposition by
prohibitng village natives from becoming mayor in their
hometowns and through careful recruitment of cadres for the
leadership groups [Harik 1974, pp. 84-100]. In Shubra, Mayor
Sayyid Kura was replaced by Ahmad Amir, a college graduate
and employee of the Ministry of Local Government in another
town in Beheira Province. He became leader of the mobilization
drive largely through his activities in the Youth Organization
and in association with the village socialist institute.
In forming the leadership group in 1966, district party
leaders bypassed Sayyid Kura, leader of the Committee of
Twenty, and accepted Amir's recommendations for secretary and
members of the leadership group. Two peasants, both asso-
ciated with Amir, were appointed as secretary and assistant
secretary of the leadership group. Both individuals were
from small patrilinial kinship groups, and both owned less
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than four afdina of land. Amir's position allowed him to
overcome the local opposition of the two previously powerful
blocs: the Kuras and Shawi ' s agrarian reform peasants.
Neither group was represented in the leadership group which
consisted of 45 members.
The effects of the mobilization program were to strengthen
and coordinate party leadership at the subnational level;
to create local political opportunities and expand political
activity, especially among the youth; and in some cases,
to replace local leaders with a new cadre of clients linked
to the patronage of district and province-level party leaders.
The mobilization program promoted local involvement in develop-
ment projects and increased political awareness, but the
scope of awareness was community bound. Fakhouri's study of
Kafr el-Elow indicates that villagers did not identify the
ASU with socialist ideology, but rather with the "good
works" and self-help programs that it fostered, especially
as related to education and employment [Fakhouri 1972, p. 108].
Other studies indicate that villagers understood only those
aspects of ideology that directly related to the conditions
of village life. For example, their understanding of socialism
might be expressed by relating development activities such as
a new road or construction of schools to the central govern-
ment [Harik 1971] . The ASU promoted subnational autonomy
with considerable local influence exercised by district
party cadre, but the impact of this on village politics is
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difficult to assess since the mobilization period was ended
before it really began to take hold. In comparison with
the two previous parties, this period of ASU activity has
been the most successful in terms of its national objective
of getting the citizenry involved in developmental projects
sponsored by the regime.
Sabri ' s creation of a new clientage of middle-class
influentials could only have been done with Nasir's compliance.
It is likely that Nasir's intention was to use the ASU struc-
ture as a counterweight to the increased independence of
elites within the bureaucracy and the military. Their reac-
tions to the ASU provides more evidence.
Amer voiced his dissatisfaction in 1965, and attacked the
basic principle of the single-party system [Sadat 1978,
pp. 168-169]. Amer's position was supported by the techno-
cratic elite and by the Ministry of the Interior. The rivalry
between the "centers of pwer" continued until the demise of
Amer in 1967 and Sabri in 1971.
The ASU itself began to threaten Nasir's ability to retain
control. By the Fall of 1967, Nasir's proclamations regarding
the ASU claimed that it was being exploited as a base for
38
rival politial power. The demise of the mobilization program,
subsequent to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, is most often explained
in terms of the need for Nasir to reassert himself personally
3 8See Nasir's comments in Raymond W. Baker, Egypt '
s
Uncertain Revolution Under Nasir and Sadat (Cambridge:
Harvard Press, 1978), pp. 112-113.
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after the Egyptian defeat, to establish a "government of
reconstruction" or to establish a consensus in the wake of
national crisis by returning to the election of party officers.
The basis for these arguments is that serious rioting broke
out in Helwan, Alexandria and Cairo in February and March
196 8 over the leniency of legal action taken against certain
military officers for their actions during the Six-Day War
[Mansfield 1973, pp. 310-313] . The argument contends that
demonstrators also demanded freedom of the press and disso-
lution of the ASU, thus forcing Nasir to recognize the extra-
legal political participation. Nasir' s "30 March Program"
to revitalize the revolution through the reinstatement of
elections was thus interpreted as a recapitulation by Nasir
to the political demands of the masses.
While this argument is plausible, it is totally inconsis-
tent with the political culture. It is more likely that
Nasir' s intent was to reassert his personal authority over
the ASU . That is to say, the mobilization program was
abandoned due to its success, rather than its failure. At
a time when Nasir needed to reasert his authority, he abandoned
the activists of the new party organization which was becoming
more unified and threatening. Realizing that elections would
re-establish the influence of a traditional and competing
elite whose support he could be assured, Nasir launched the
"30 March Program." Although problematic, this argument
accounts for a political culture that is built on ingroup-outgroup
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rivalry and expedient alliances at national level, a politi-
cal culture characteristic of clientelism and personal
relationships and not of mass participation.
"Demobilization" began in the fall of 1967 when Nasir
disbanded the activist Youth Organization of the ASU [Harik
1973] . By June of 1968, the party organization was restored
to its basic 1963 formal party structure; the Peoples'
Assembly was restored and new elections began. The new
party elections provided Nasir a supportive ASU Supreme
Executive Committee of three elected RCC members and five
appointed members
.
The local elections of 1968 in Shubra were contested
between three political blocs: the Kuras, the agrarian
reform peasants and the old leadership group cadre under
Amir [Harik 1974] . The results restored the Kuras to office
with four seats on the Committee of Ten; the agrarian reform
peasants won two seats and included Shawi, and four seats
were won by independnets none of whom were associated with
Amir. In Shubra, the demobilization of the ASU effected
"retraditionalization" in party leadership and Mayor Amir
was removed from office by the district.
At the subnational level, political activism, competition
and autonomy are acceptable to the regime provided political
interests remain community-bound. Fostering "political
participation at the local level has proven to be a useful
device of authoritarian regimes for encouraging support
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without the growth of political demands;" however, in
Egypt's patrimonial system, local autonomy is a necessary
39device.
D. NASIR AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE
Nasir's effect upon the political culture was to verify,
even intensify, the norms of traditional political control
through heightened emphasis upon both veritcal (patron-client)
and horizontal ( shilla ) associational ties. Nasir's personal
style of rule required him to continually monitor shifting
affiliations and potential opposition. The military officer
corps, characterized as nationalistic and modern, became the
principal source of the political and bureaucratic elite.
With the primary purpose of insuring his regime, Nasir placed
trusted clients in key positions within the military, the
bureaucracy and the party structure and established an
40intricate intelligence and security apparatus. The social
origin of Egypt's new elite was the rural middle class, which
included most of the traditional leadership of the pre-
revolutionary umdah system.
The rural notability's domination of Nasir's organizational
structures, especially the National Union and the ASU, was
39Myron Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of
Political Process," in Binder, Crises and Sequences , p. 198.




accomplished by both the government's failure to mobilize
the countryside, and in areas where political awareness
was heightened, by the traditional leaders' success in
dominating the local party structures. The umdah with his
combination of landed wealth, administrative influence and
horizontal ties remained in a position of sufficient local
influence to acquire reciprocal vertical linkages. While
agricultural wealth remained the primary basis of influence,
the factors of modernization reduced the prominence of family
influence. However, Egypt's rural notables have maintained
their political and economic influence by family links with
the military, the bureaucracy and the free professions
[Binder 1978, pp. 226-227].
Largely through Nasir's successful and activist foreign
policy, he emerged as a true charismatic leader in the
"Weberian" sense. Nonetheless, he was unable to undermine
the umdah system or routinize charisma through various single-
party structures [Entelis 1974]. The limitation of Nasir's
charismatic authority can only be understood with respect to
Egypt's political culture. As this analysis has shown:
(1) Egyptian political culture is directive.
(2) It values and in many ways demands that its
leader be charismatic - that he replicate the
qualities of the prophet and the tribal shaikh .
(3) The leader's authority is a measure of his per-
sonality. It can not be routinized through
institutional structures.
(4) The internalized duality of mistrust and acceptance
precludes truly totalitarian leadership.
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(5) The degree to which the leader moves between
authoritarian and patrimonial leadership is a
function of his ability to attain and maintain
charisma.
The implication of these findings for political partici-
pation is not entirely clear. Participation in Egypt is
usually limited to elite access, interest articulation through
vertical interpersonal relations and possibly incremental
decision-making within formal institutions because of strong
horizontal ties. Strong charismatic leadership is dysfunc-
tional to a participant political culture because the polity
depends on the leader to solve problems and acquiesces to
41his judgments. Although political participation would
expand under a more patrimonial leader, the nature of partici-
pation in Egypt would continue to be limited and non-institu-
tional, despite the existence of formal institutions such
as parties, parliaments, unions and syndicates. In Egypt,
there is no precedent for sharing power or allowing anything
but supportive opposition, and the only opposition movements
that have ever gained ascendency in Egypt have been conspira-
torial in nature. It is unlikely that a participant politi-
cal culture will emerge under either a strong charismatic
leader or a weak patrimonial leader. The political legacy
that Nasir passed on after his death in 1970 was one that
41 ...See Shawky Zeidan's analysis of charisma and partici-
pation in Egypt in which he posits that charisma can be used
to impede or promote participation. "Charismatic Leadership
and Political Participation: The Case of Nasir' s Egypt,"




was dependent upon personal control and non-institutional
authority; one in which true opposition could not be




IV. THE SADAT ERA: CONSISTENCY OR CHANGE
A. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER
There was no legitimate heir apparent when Nasir died.
Sadat's appointment as sole vice-president in 1969 provided
him his only legitimacy; Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din, recommended
by Nasir as his successor when Nasir resigned temporarily
in 1967, had since lost much of his stature; and Ali Sabri
had been weakened when Nasir demobilized the ASU . The
Supreme Executive Committee (SEC) of the ASU decided among
themselves that Sadat should assume the presidency, with
the understanding that his authority was to be largely repre-
sentative of the committee which included Muhyi al-Din, Sabri,
Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi and Sami Sharaf . Sadat's first act
independent of the committee was his order in December of
19 70 to return land sequestered by the government since 1961
to its rightful owners. A second event which had serious
implications for the ASU was Sadat's announcement that he had
reached an agreement for the union of Egypt, Libya and Syria.
Ali Sabri, Sadat's main opponent in the Executive Committee,
saw this as an opportunity to unseat Sadat, because neither
the union issue nor its draft constitution were popular within
the ASU or the assembly [Burrell and Kelidar 1977, p. 16]
.
Sabri 's opposition forced Sadat to bring the issue to a SEC
vote, which was split 3-3 due to the absence of one member.
Sadat called upon Interior Minister Gum 'a to exercise an
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ex-officio vote, and Gum* a sided with Sabri [Waterbury 1978,
p. 4]. Sadat, losing the support of Gum' a and Minister
of War Mohammed Fawzi, whom he had originally appointed on
42Heikal *s advice, seized the initiative. Sadat turned
to two professional army officers for support, Chief of
Staff General Sadiq and Commander of the Presidential Guard
General Nassif; Sadat also secured the support of Mamduh
Salim, officially the Governor of Alexandria, but unofficially
second in command of Gum'a's security apparatus [Heikal 1975,
p. 134] . Heikal reported that Sadat discussed his intention
to dismiss Sabri with the Soviet Ambassador the day before
the committee vote, in an effort to insure the Soviets that
Safari's dismissal was not intended to signal a change in
Egyptian-Soviet relations [Heikal 1975, p. 128] . It is
possible that Sadat proposed the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship (signed just weeks later) during this meeting.
Sadat announced the dismissal of Sabri, and the remaining
members of the SEC resigned in protest. The entire group of
conspirators, totalling ninety-one, were arrested and later
sentenced [Baker 1978, p. 126] . With his victory over Sabri,
the so-called "Corrective Revolution," Sadat consolidated his
rule. Although the details of the Sadat-Sabri showdown remain
questionable, the political influence of the military and
42See the details of Fawzi' s appointment in Mohammed





security forces as "insurers of the regime" can not be
disputed. The incident also underscores the validity
or patron-client approaches to Egyptian politics, complete
with transient alliances and rival factions.
B. THE RAMADAN WAR
Sadat proclaimed 1971 as the "year of decision," the
year in which he would solve the stalemate with Israel,
but no solutions were forthcoming. The "no-war, no-peace"
situation since 1967 became increasingly untenable. U.S.
satisfaction with Israeli dominance in the Six-Day War was
such that little pressure could be exerted to generate a
settlement. U.S. -Soviet interest seemingly converged on
keeping Mid-East tensions reduced. Domestically, nationalist
sentiment to regain captured territory began to challenge
Sadat openly. In a 19 72 memorandum to Sadat from ten prominent
politicains and military officers, including Baghdadi and
Air Force General Madkuri al-Izz, demands were made for Sadat
to restore Egypt's position between the superpowers, limit
43dependence on the Soviets and end the Israeli occupation.
War Minister Sadiq supported the memorandum and pressured Sadat
to decrease the Soviet influence, yet demanded additional
military hardware to mount an offensive against Israel [Amos
1979, pp. 104-105] . Sadat finally dismissed Sadiq, along with
43 The text of this memorandum, describing the decadence




his deputy, the navy commander and one division commander
[Haddad 1973, p. 183] . The evidence strongly suggests that
Sadat's expulsion of between 15,000-20,000 Soviet advisers
in July of 1972 was largely due to military pressure.
Convinced of the necessity for war, Sadat fostered a
conciliation with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Hafiz al-
Assad of Syria and the confrontation states. The Egyptian
Army planned and rehearsed its attack; communication and
logistic networks were established - the war was launched
to the world's surprise. Despite the encirclement of the
Egyptian Third Army toward the end of the war , the October
War was a tremendous success for Egypt. The military regained
its stature and Sadat greatly enhanced his own legitimacy
and prestige as the "Hero of the Crossing."
C. THE "OPENING" AND LIBERALIZATION
After Sadat's "Corrective Revolution" in 1971, he acceler-
ated his earlier liberalization policy, freeing hundreds of
political prisoners and reinstating public officials who
had lost their jobs through arbitrary decisions. A new con-
stitution enacted in 19 71 confirmed the supremacy of the
Peoples' Assembly over the ASU and emphasized the rule of
law. The constitution also provided for the continued auton-
omy of the local government, which in effect indicated Sadat's
verification of the regime's linkage with the rural elite.
Article 162 states, "local popular councils will be formed
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gradually through direct elections as administrative units."
Article 162 also confirms the gradual transfer of power to
local councils and the election of council chairmen (mayors)
from among the council membership.
In May 1972, Sadat began building his "state of insti-
tutions" by calling for committee debate on the future of
44the ASU. Although no changes were immediately forthcoming,
these debates would be resumed nationally in 19 74. The
liberalized atmosphere in which these debates took place
reflected a new concern with democratic forms within
intellectual and certain political circles. The Peoples'
Assembly began to assume an increased role in policy scrutiny
and criticism which Sadat allowed to continue [Mater 1973] .
Likewise, the ASU elections of 1972 were characterized by a
larger number of competing candidates, indicating that the
ASU was gradually being accepted as a legitimate agency for
elite access and increased participation at the national level.
Studies of several villages originally conducted in the early
1960s and replicated in 1973 and 1974 indicate that local
village leaders were able to function in an autonomous manner
within the structure of the ASU, and that they could do so in
45
ways not inconsistent with the traditional political culture.
44Excerpts of these debates were published in Al-Tali 'a
,
May-June 1972, some of which are available in JPRS-MENA
,
Jun-July, 1972.
45Comapre the divergent conclusion in James B. Mayfield,
Local Institutions
, pp. 140-144 with those in his earlier
work, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt (Austin: Univ. of
Texas Press, 1971), pp. 253-259.
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In the wake of the October War and impelled by desperate
economic conditions, high military expenditures and a large
external debt, Sadat developed a new strategy. The strategy
was indeed new, because it accounted for U.S. -Soviet detente
and the successful use of the "oil weapon" during the war.
Sadat's "October Paper," presented to a joint ASU-Peoples 1
Assembly meeting in April of 19 74, contained the basic
formula:
By diversifying the economy Egypt could attract Arab
and Western capital investment and Western technology,
thereby providing new employment opportunities and
economic growth. [UAR 1974]
Sadat's "economic opening" or inf itah policy imposed certain
domestic and diplomatic imperatives. To attract large-scale
Western investment, Sadat would have to loosen the Soviet
connection and create regional stability through a negotiated
settlement acceptable to Israel (i.e., U.S. sponsored).
Sadat initiated exploratory efforts to obtain arms (a domestic
imperative) in 1974 and 1975 from the U.S., Italy, France and
Britain.
The second major initiative of Sadat's internal policies
after the October War has been political liberalization.
In August 1974, Sadat presented a document known as the "Paper
on the Evolution of the ASU" to an ad hoc "Listening Committee."
The paper was to be the basis of a "national dialogue" re-
garding the ASU and contained recommendations that the president
4 6




be separated from the ASU leadership, that several forums
of opinion be relfected in the ASU and the press, that all
party elections be direct elections, and that ASU membership
be optional [Waterbury 1978, pp. 252-253] . Listening Com-
mittee hearings were conducted during September 19 74 with
various groups including: professors, students, feminists,
labor unions, the press, professional unions and associations
including doctors, writers and businessmen, and several
meetings were held with various village peasants. In line
with Sadat's policy of keeping the military apolitical, it
is not surprising that military representatives did not
participate in the hearings. The major findings of the com-
mittee were vaguely expressed in Al-Ahram in December 1974,
and wittingly or unwittingly, very closely resembled Sadat's
• -4.- i *.- 47initial suggestions.
As early as the Spring of 1975, the quasi-official press
began to reflect the political spectrum in their editorial
48
opinion. Three minbar (literally meaning "mosque pulpits"
in Arabic) of opinion gradually developed modest but recog-
nizable platforms. In January of 1976, Sadat convened a Com-
mission on the Future of Political Action and based on its
Al-Ahram , 18 December 1974.
48The leftist press was represented by Al-Ahali , Rose
al-Yussef (weekly) and Al-Tali 'a (monthly) ; the right pri-
marily by Akhbar , Akhbar al-Yom and Al-Musawwar ; and the
center by Al-Ahram and Al-Gumhuriyya . The terms left,
right and center do not equate to Western usage.
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findings, Sadat proposed the institutionalization of three
platforms within the ASU: the left, the right and the
center. The left platform, known as the National Progressive
Union Grouping, was a Marxist, neo-Nasirist oriented group
favoring emphasis on public sector investment and has criti-
cized Sadat's "open-door economic policy" as premature;
the center platform, the Egyptian Arab Socialist Organization,
supported current government policy and stressed Sadat's
gradual liberalization programs and a mixed economy; the
Social Liberalists comprised the right platform and stressed
private enterprise-capitalism and the de-emphasis of coopera-
tive production and marketing [Burrell and Kelidar 1977,
pp. 30-44]
.
Preparations for the October 1976 Peoples' Assembly elec-
tions were characterized by a great deal of intraparty debate,
with the majority of representatives making known their plat-
form affiliation. Although Egyptian national elections in
the past have merely renewed the political legitimacy of
incumbents and confirmed new alliances, the October 1976
elections were unusually competitive with some 1,660 persons
vying for 350 seats [Clarity 1976] . The elections, which
have been described as free and open, established a strong
majority of 280 seats for the centrists; the right won twelve
seats and the left won two. Independent candidates accounted
for 48 seats. The remaining eight seats, traditionally
appointed by the president, were awarded to representatives
of the Coptic minority.
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In his inaugural speech after re-election in November
1976, Sadat announced that the three platforms would be
recognized as political parties within the ASU general
organization [Tanner 1976] . The government passed a
"Political Parties Law" which established the requirements
. . 49for obtaining party status.
Upon the enactment of the Political Parties Law, two
groups expressed interest: a small group of military officers
and the pre-revolutionary Wafd Party. The army officers were
forced to withdraw their request under threat of courts-
martial by Defense Minister Gamasi, thus confirming Sadat's
expressed policy toward military political activity [Tanner
1976] . Under the leadership of Fu'ad al-Din, the Wafd applied
for party status after having met the requirements of the law,
which included affiliation with at least twenty representa-
tives in the Peoples' Assembly. Indicating that the "New-
Wafd's" program was in compliance with the social gains of
the 1952 Revolution and that its program was not associated
with that of the pre-revolutionary party, the application
was approved in February 197 8. Approval of the Wafd had been
the subject of much debate, since Sadat often stated his
dislike of the "party of the pashas . " The accpetance of the
party caused a realignment of parliamentary seats
49See the discussion of Parties Law in "Rebirth of the
Wafd," Middle East Intelligence Survey (1-15 February, 1978)
pp. 162-163 and the text of the law in Ali Dessouki, ed.,
"Democracy in Egypt," Cairo Papers in Social Science (Cairo:
AUC, 1978) , pp. 86-89.
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with the Wafd gaining the support of twenty-four
deputies.
By May of 1978, it became apparent to the Sadat
regime that the National Progressive Grouping and the
Wafd Party were directing their efforts towards blocking
legislation introduced by the government and endorsed by
51the centrist Egypt Party. The administration viewed these
efforts and their opposition to Sadat's peace settlement as
violations of the Political Parties Law, and as a real
challenge to Egyptian political stability and social peace.
At a time when Sadat was receiving severe criticism from
other Arab states because of his peace initiative with
Israel, further internal political agitation could not be
tolerated. In order to remove adversary political party
leaders without compromising his personally sponsored "demo-
cratic experiment," Sadat devised a scheme to hold a national
referendum to determine if current Wafdist and National Pro-
gressive Grouping party leaders should be permitted to remain
in office. The May 1978 referendum was approved by 9 8 per-
cent of the voters, and verified Sadat's tight personal
4. i 5 2control.
"Neo-Wafd to Assume Main Opposition Role," Al-Ahram ,




"The Story of Democratic Looseness in Egypt: The First
Correction to the Corrective Revolution," Kuwait: Al-Qabas
,
May 20, 1978, p. 15. Trans, in JPRS-MENA , July 13, 1978.
52
"Fate of Parties Weighed in Light of Recent Measures,"
Paris: Al-Nahar , May 27, 1978, p. 6. Trans, in JPRS-MENA ,
July 18, 1978.

Sadat's technique of engineering the removal of trouble-
some political opponents in the name of the people, and at
the same time, confirming his desire for a controlled form
of political party opposition within Egyptian politics was
effective, yet not fully successful. Rather than assume
the leadership of a "supportive opposition," the Wafd dis-
53
solved itself in June 1978. The short history of the New-
Wafd provides an illustration of the limited development
of Egyptian party politics and the continuity of a political
culture that will not allow true opposition to develop
institutionally or otherwise.
In August 1978, Sadat announced the formation of the
National Democratic Party (NDP) under his own leadership,
rendered the ASU structure defunct, and provided the NDP
constituent committee with some principles to guide the
development of the party's platform. The party's formation
was aimed at consolidating political support among the Egypt
Party, which merged with the NDP, independent representatives,
and some representatives previously aligned with the Wafd.
In an address to the parliamentary body of the NDP, Sadat
reaffirmed the democratic measures of the "October Revolu-
54tion" and expressed the need for a consolidated opposition party.
53
"Reason for Dissolution of Wafd Probed," Paris: Al-
Mustaqbal , June 17, 1978, pp. 22-24. Trans, in JPRS-MENA ,
August 14, 1978.
54Al-Sadat Chairs Meeting of NDP Parliamentary Body,"
Cairo Domestic Service
, October 29, 1978. Trans, in FBIS-
MENA, October 30, 1978.
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Shortly thereafter, a right-of-center opposition party,
the Social Labor Party, was formed by Ibrahim Shukri, In
the June 1979 Peoples' Assembly elections, Sadat's new NDP
55
won 89 percent of the vote. Numerous irregularities were
reported in the highly equivocal elections.
Sadat's political liberalization policies and his pur-
ported institutionalization of competitive party politics
are unquestionably suspect. The political aspects of
Sadat's "turn to the West" have been viewed as mere props,
designed to convince potential foreign investors that Egypt's
new look is more than rhetoric, and to alleviate any suspicion
of future nationalizations and sequestrations [Burrell and
Kelidsr 1977, pp. 22-23]. On the surface, such an analysis
is plausible , but it does not account for the gradual imple-
mentation of Sadat's "democratic experiment," nor is it con-
sistent with the regime's effort to restrict party politics
to supportive parties. It is not likely that potential
investors, especially Western investors, would view techniques
such as the referendum of May 19 78, or the election results
of June 1979, as examples of "evolutionary democracy." More
significantly, such an analysis fails to consider the permanence
of Egyptian political culture, one in which political power
55Of the 365 contested seats, the NDP won 326; Indepen-
dents, 10; Socialist Labor/Social Liberalist, 29; and National
Progressive Grouping, 0. Ten seats were appointed to repre-
sentative Coptic leaders. See Stanley Reed, "Egypt after
the Elections," MEED Arab Report , July 4, 1979, pp. 5-6.
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has never been institutionalized. Sadat is a master at
eliminating political opposition. His concerns for improv-
ing social justice and eliminating inefficiency are consistent
with the traditional authority pattern of benevolent patron.
The practical application of Sadat's "state of institutions"
is that it provides arenas in which he can manipulate clients
in such a way as to increase his own control.
In January 19 77, Egypt lifted consumer food subsidies
under pressure from Arab creditors and the International Mone-
tary Fund. The government's action caused widespread rioting
and demonstratins in Cairo, and other cities, which were
eventually brought under control by the police and the army.
The government was forced to restore the subsidies, and
blamed the rioting on subversive groups within Egypt, including
the outlawed Communist Party, and foreign support from Libya.
Sadat declared a state of emergency and proposed a Referendum
on Safeguarding National Unity, which received the expected
widespread approval, and legitimized Sadat's crackdown on the
left. Over 2,000 citizens were arrested, although only thirty-
six were brought to trial. During the Spring of 1977, the
press was brought under tighter control by the direct appointment
For a resume of the trials, see Janet Stevens, "Politi-




of supportive journalists to managerial and editorial
i * 57positions on leading newspapers.
Efforts to unite several of Egypt's opposition groups
into a National Front against Sadat have been headed by ex-
Army Commander-in-Chief General Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili and
Abd al-Majid Farid. Shadhili has reportedly enlisted the
support of various internal opposition groups with the marked
exception of the Muslim Brethren, and has secured assistance
from Syria, Libya and Algeria. The National Front has been
particularly critical of Sadat's peace initiatives and im-
proved relations with the US, and Shadhili has announced
5 8
his intention to oust Sadat by revolutionary means if necessary.
The National Front's inability to secure the support of the
Muslim Brethren largely reduces their potential impact.
The Islamic right is much more capable of disrupting
domestic stability as evidenced by the regime's cautious
57Appointments included Musa Sabri at Al-Akhbar , Anis
Mansur at the newly created quasi-official October , Yussef
Siba'i at Al-Ahram, Mursi Shafa'i at Rose al-Yussef , and
Salah Galal at Al-Tali 'a . See Waterbury, Burdens , p. 316
/ and the discussion of recent press restrictions in "Inter-
nation Press Institute Protests at Press Ban," An-Nahar
Arab Report and Memo , 28 August 19 79, p. 3 and Munir K.
Nasser, Press, Politics and Power: Egypt's Heikal and
Al-Ahram (Ames: Iowa State Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 19-
28.
58 See "Egyptian Nationalist Front Leader Holds Press
Conference in Beirut," Voice of Palestine , 2 April 19 80,
trans, in FBIS, 3 April 1980.
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approach to Islamic opposition. The recent increase in
Muslim fundamentalist violence against the Coptic minority,
estimated at ten percent of the population, is directly
related to the peace process. Relations with Israel and
increased ties with the U.S. are interpreted as evidence of
Coptic/Christian ascendency in Egypt [Finnegan 1980]
.
Despite the Copts' perception of being "politically under-
privileged," Sadat has significantly increased the number
of Christians in highly placed government service compared
to the number appointed by Nasir [Dessouki 1978, p. 63 and
59Brodin 1978]. The economic beneficiaries of Sadat's inf itah
policy, which were represented by the now defunct Wafd Party,
are yet another set of potential challengers to Sadat's
ability to maintain control [Choucri and Eckhaus 1979]
.
The establishment of the Egyptian multi-party system has
aroused a great deal of political interest and likely
broadened political participation, yet it has not been capa-
ble of generating loyal opposition. Sadat carefully devised
a democratic form under the tutelage of the ASU's Executive
Committee and now under the NDP ' s Political Bureau, which he
6
controls through traditional patronage relationships.
59Examples include Musa Sabri, editor of Al-Akhbar; Kamal
al-Mallakh, editorial writer for Al-Ahram , Foreign Minister
Boutros Boutros Ghali and Deputy Prime Minister Fikri Makram
Ubayd.
For a perceptive view of single-party tutelage in the
Middle East, see Enver M. Koury, The Patterns of Mass
Movements in Arab Revolutionary Progressive States" ("Hague
:
Mouton, 1970), pp. 220-259.
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Sadat's liberalization policies may be genuinely aimed at
promoting social and economic justice and at reducing
inefficiency, but they are by no means democratic. Though
Sadat appears intent on building his "state of institutions,"
his ability to remain in control rests largely with the con-
tinued suppression of real opposition and the support of the
military.
Sadat has brought "liberalized" institutions, syndicates
and associations under his control by appointing supportive
clients, and when deemed necessary, by restricting his
liberalization policies for the sake of "national unity."
Sadat's recent cabinet reshuffle of May 1980 and his assump-
tion of the position of prime minister is indicative of his
need to assert more personal control and demonstrate that
something is being done to combat Egypt's economic problems.
Likewise, Sadat's unilateral suspension of the Camp David
autonomy negotiations three weeks before the 26 May 1980 dead-
line for reaching an agreement with Israel was designed not
only to increase U.S. resolve to assert pressure on Israel, but
also to soften the domestic reaction to Sadat's failure to
6
1
obtain an agreement in accordance with the treaty timetable.
Cabinet members appointed on 14 May 1980 are listed in
the Middle East Economic Digest , 16 May 1980, p. 15. For
details of Sadat's suspension of the autonomy talks , see
New York Times, 8, 15 and 16 May 1980.
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V. FROM NASIR TO SADAT: MILITARY ROLE OR RULE
Egyptian politics since the Free Officers' coup d'etat
in 1952 have been characterized by such terms as interven-
tionist, praetorian, even "stratiocratic, " all of which assert
direct control by a core of military elites. Once in control,
military officers have attempted to perpetuate their rule
and attain their goals of modernization by establishing what
Samuel Hungtington has called a "community without politics,
a consensus by command" [Huntington 1978, p. 244]. The
principal architect had been Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. Through
his placement of trusted military officers in virtually all
key positions within the government structure, and by estab-
lishment of an intricate security apparatus, Nasir established
a regime that was, at least in the opinion of one operative,
"virtually coup-proof" [Copeland 1969, p. 235].
Shortly after assuming power upon the death of Nasir in
19 70, Anwar al-Sadat began a policy of limited liberaliza-
tion. Sequestered lands were returned to their original
owners, and hundreds of political prisoners were freed. Sadat
announced that he would build a "state of institutions,"
and in 19 72, promoted open debate on the future of the Arab
6 2Socialist Union (ASU) . Sadat has continued his policy of
6 2
Excerpts of these debates were published in Al-Tali '
a
,
Al-Ahram , and Egyptian Gazette , May-June, 1972. English




liberalization and slowly dismantled many of Nasir's net-
works of control. These changes and an increase in the
level of access to important positions by technocrats and
experts apparently indicate a less pervasive role for the
military under Sadat.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the changing
role of the Egyptian military in politics, to determine if
apparent modifications in elite access actually represent
a shift in power, and to determine the limits within which
the military is likely to remain restive.
A. THE MILITARY UNDER NASIR
1. The 1952 Coup d'Etat and the Consolidation of Power
During the evening of 22-23 July 1952, the Free
Officers, with troops under their command, marched on the
General Headquarters and seized control; government buildings,
telephone exchanges, and radio stations were secured; and
armor and infantry units were stationed along the road to
Suez . Notes were sent to foreign envoys warning them not to
interfere in a "purely internal affair" [Mansfield 19 78, p.
286] . By morning the swift and almost bloodless coup d'etat
was complete.
From its inception the coup was elitist. Within the mili-
tary structure, the Free Officer movement was limited to junior
and mid-range officers, with a nucleus of ten to fourteen
officers. The Free Officers maintained what appears to have
been limited contact with several civilian groups prior to
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the takeover, including the Muslim Brethren, the Wafd, Young
Egypt, and the Marxists; however, they did not act in con-
cert with these groups. The inner core of officers was
linked by personal, non-institutional ties, and each member
headed secondary groups of officers, each estimated to be
as large as twenty-five. The fact that there was no involve-
ment by supportive civilian groups and that no effort was
made to tap the "revolutionary situation" of the masses
demonstrated by numerous riots and the events of Black Satur-
day, suggests a conscious decision on the part of the Free
Officers to restrict popular participation. In his Philosophy
of the Revolution , Nasir purports that the Free Officers
were prepared to relinquish the reins of government [Nasir
1954, pp. 31-32]. Yet, one biographer reports that Nasir
ordered no publicity be given to the Free Officers except
for General Naguib, and that "if we had the sense to let an
older man like Naguib be the figurehead, we could retain
6 3
our unity" [St. John 1960, p. 113]. Although problematic,
it seems the initial intent was to maintain control.
A second emphasis was unity within the inner circle of
officers and its eventaul corollary, an effort to establish
a strong national and unified army. Nasir stated that the
According to Sadat, General Aziz Ali al-Misri and
General Fouad Sadek were approached to assume the role
of symbolic leader before, and in preference to, General





"political ideas of the Free Officers differed," and in order
to avoid a split in the movement, they decided against draw-
64ing up a precise political program. Unity of the army
was given substance when more than four hundred officers
were purged, including all colonels and above with only
two exceptions [Smith 1977, p. 42] . While the Free Officers
assumed political positions, vacant military posts were
filled by military officers considered reliable and competent;
only Abdul Hakim Amer received an accelerated promotion to
general, thereby preserving the military's organizational
integrity [Be'eri 1970, p. 106], Nasir's suspicion of
organized political groups, characterized by the banning of
political parties in 1953 and the Muslim Brethren in 1954,
was not limited to civilian groups. In 1954, Nasir stated:
"I have made a careful study of the army. And I have con-
cluded that each officer has at least five others with him
a hundred percent. And each of those has five others, and
so on" [Wynn 1959, p. 61].
Nasir's suspicion of the military and his trust in Amer
(only Nasir and Amer knew the names of all Free Officer mem-
bers) became apparent in Nasir's early problems with Naguib,
who became increasingly desirous of power, and who had the
backing of the cavalry through Free Officer Khalid Muhyi al-Din
64
Al Ahram interview with Nasir in June, 19 53. The
lack of doctrine, program, and political organization were
confirmed by Nasir in The Charter of National Action, 1961
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According to St. John's account, Nasir conceded the presi-
dency and premiership of the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC) to Naguib, but demanded that Amer be appointed to
Naguib ' s current position as commander-in-chief and that
Nasir himself control the Ministry of the Interior, arguing
"that he and he alone had been watching the machinations and
plotting of the opposition; he could do it better if he had
the machinery of security under his direct control" [St.
John 1960, p. 159]. By February 1954, Naguib seriously con-
fronted Nasir in two public challenges: (1) Naguib resigned,
which caused a public furor that returned him to office;
(2) Naguib announced a return to parliamentary government and
scheduled elections in June. With the backing of the mili-
tary and police, Nasir assumed the premiership of the RCC in
March 1954, installed a new cabinet that excluded Muhyi al-
Din, and cancelled the elections.
The social origins of the military elite have been the
65
subject of considerable study. Generally, the elite were
the sons of peasant and urban middle classes, but not
bourgeoisie in the European sense. Naguib stated that the
"officers' corps was largely composed of the sons of civil
servants and soldiers and the grandsons of peasants" [Naguib
1955, pp. 14-15]. Be'eri's study of a sample of 87 Egyptian
officers that fought during the 194 8 Palestine War confirms
The most complete is R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir





these social backgrounds. Regardless of whether or not the
new military ruling elite is described as a "new middle
class," either in liaison with, or in control of, other
middle class elements of merchants and bureaucrats, they
6 6
have not been "agents" of class. The ruling military elite
conceive of themselves more as a secular, modernizing corpor-
ate group than as a class-conscious group. The larger the
elite group became, the more diversified its economic and
social background became.
With the appointment of Nasir's first cabinet, many
members of which were Free Officers, there was also a
"massive infusion of officers into key bureaucratic positions
for purposes of control and supervision" [Dekmejian 1971,
p. 170] . Through this influx of officers into leadership
positions during the first few years of his regime, Nasir
had pre-empted all political activity in Egypt [Holt, 1968]
.
Heavy reliance on military and security personnel allowed
the regime to govern without identifying or allying itself
openly with any particular social class. While this allowed
for increased flexibility, the insulation of the regime from
the society was later recognized as a detriment. In the
early years of the regime "civilian support was not crucial
to the military" [Perlmutter 1977, p. 159].
For a brief comparison of the concepts of class according
to Binder, Halpern, Huntington, etc., see Amos Perlmutter,
"Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle Class: A Comparative
Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10
(October, 1967), pp. 46-65.
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By the end of 19 54, Nasir had consolidated his power,
initiated social reform, and managed to secure an agreement
with the British to remove all their forces from Suez by
1956. The early years of the regime established a number
of trends which would in large measure continue to character-
ize the regime until his death in 1970:
(1) He established a generally non-ideological
military elite that was both secular and modern.
(2) The suspicion surrounding the activities of
the Free Officers and Nasir 's desire to monitor
security personally signalled the future establishment
of an extensive security and intelligence apparatus.
(3) Control of the military was essential; its
leaders would be selected based on loyalty above all
else.
(4) Nasir' s rule was highly personal and non-
institutional. Political power was to be enhanced
through direct relationship with Nasir or one of his
"trusted clients." Separate sources of political
power, such as parties, were repressed.
(5) Through its positions of power within the
government and the bureaucracy, the new military elite
began to direct change and "modernization from above."
The important nationalist influence of the military
and its loosely defined linkage to the rural middle
class, enhanced its use as a conscious and deliberate
agent of change.
The character of Nasir' s Egypt in the early years of the
regime (1952-1955) was one of highly personal control through
direct use of the military. The military as a national insti-
67tution, in fact, became the new ruling elite. However,
6 7
Vatikiotis called this phenomenon "stratiocracy " and
its leader, Nasir, a "strategos." See "Some Political Con-
sequences of the 1952 Revolution" in Peter M. Holt, etc.,






this immense penetration of military control was not immuta-
6 8ble: in short, Egypt did not remain a praetorian society.
Nasir's goals of modernization and the recognized need for
political mobilization to support the regime's development
programs precluded the dominant, if not single, role that
the military played in the early years of the regime. While
the military's role in politics continued to be pervasive,
it was neither centralized nor complete. Nasir promoted this
broadening of political influence himself, relying on the
military as needed to retain control. An analysis of the
role of the military during this period is difficult because
its influence was diffuse. A functional analysis in the
areas of defense, foreign policy, internal security and
domestic politics must be combined with the aspects of elitism
and clientage, because of the lack of an institutional basis
for power and Nasir's emphasis on personalist rule.
2. Military as a Fighting Force: Foreign Policy
Implications
The striking victory of the Israeli Army in the
Palestine War of 194 8, and later revelations of royal com-
plicity in the sale of defective arms, shocked Nasir and
his fellow junior officers. Disgusted with the incompetence
of senior officers, Nasir stated:
6 8
For a similar opinion, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab
Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), pp. 244-247.
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Engaging in many different kinds of tyranny and
corruption, they were fawning and subservient to
the British Military Mission, and a disgrace to the
uniform they wore. They spent money that belonged
to the Egyptian army on food and drink for them-
selves [St. John 1960, p. 36].
After the coup d'etat in 1952, development of the armed
forces and the acquisition of modern weapons were given high
priority. Nasir wanted to develop a competent and loyal
army. Nasir had secured initial approval of military assis-
tance from the United States in November of 1954, but a
major "retaliatory" Israeli raid into Gaza, which destroyed
the Egyptian army headquarters and inflicted heavy casualties,
69hastened the need for arms [Safran 1969, p. 106]. U.S.
insistence on Egyptian participation in a Western security
arrangement as a precondition for arms deliveries brought
about the Czechoslovakian arms deal in 1955. Immediately
following the U.S. reversal of a previous decision to under-
write a World Bank loan to enlarge the Aswan Dam, Nasir
defiantly nationalized the Suez Canal, tremendously enhancing
his popularity in Egypt and securing the leadership of the
Arab world. Despite heavy losses in the 1956 Sinai Campaign
69Although Nasir' s stated need for arms was to defend
Egypt against Israel, a second reason was probably to counter-
act the military advantage that would accrue to Iraq by
virtue of its entrance into the Baghdad Pact.
70The nationalization was legal under international law
since the nationalization law provided equitable compensation
to shareholders. See Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, White Paper on the Nationalization of the Suez
Maritime Canal Company (Cairo: Gov't. Press, 1956) .
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that followed, the Egyptian Army and Nasir emerged from the
Suez crisis with increased prominence. Nasir must have
realized that it was American diplomacy, and not Egyptian
prowess, that delivered him from Suez unscathed.
Equipment improvements in the military continued with
defense outlays (expressed as a percentage of GNP) increasing
from 3.9 percent in 1952, to 6 percent in 1961, to 9 percent
in 1965, and stabilizing after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War at
71 . ....
13 percent by 1969. Soviet training missions were ex-
panded, equipment deliveries increased, and by mid-1967,
total Soviet arms shipments were estimated at $1.5 billion
(U.S.); the Egyptian military had increased from 80,000 in
1952 to 220,000 in 1967 [Nyrop 1976, p. 386]. Internal
inequities in military service were improved by the National
Military Service Law of 1955, which eliminated bodaliyya
(payment in lieu of military service) , thereby improving
the education level of the military. Both Nasir and Amer
promoted professional and non-political development within
the military. Young, professional officers were promoted;
"division commanders were clearly non-political, professional
officers," according to Perlmutter's analysis [Perlmutter
1974, p. 143]
.
It is likely that the significant growth of the military
in terms of personnel and defense expenditures reflected
71Figures taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade , ACDA




not only Nasir' s belief in a strong functional military,
but also a role for the military in pursuance of his
activist foreign policy. The largest and best-equipped
military in the Arab world undoubtedly enhanced Egypt's
position of regional leadership. Nasir emphasized the
utility of Egypt's military power as an instrument of foreign
policy, both symbolically and eventually through interven-
tion.
The ill-fated union with Syria provided the first use
of the military as a foreign policy resource. The Egyptian
military with a large complement of civilian bureaucrats
was not only involved in the retraining of the Syrian mili-
tary, but also directed, supervised, and restructured its
civil administration [Kerr 1972, pp. 205-206]. The failure
of the union with Syria was quickly followed by Egyptian
military intervention in the Yemeni Civil War. Involvement
in Yemen intensified the already-strained relations with
Saudi Arabia, which supported the royalist forces. What was
probably designed to be a quick and decisive victory for
Egyptian forces, and a means of regaining status lost by the
Syrian secession, turned into "Egypt's Vietnam."
In 1965, Nasir agreed to conclude a mutual defense agree-
ment with Syria, possibly as a first step in re-unification.
The arrangement was viewed as a major deterrent to Israeli
intervention in Syria and Jordan, based on the prestige of
the Egyptian military. As Malcolm Kerr noted, the Arab
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masses viewed the Egyptian military "as the eventual spear-
head of a future liberation of Palestine" [Kerr 1972, p. 206].
Syria's reckless prods along the Israeli border and Jordan's
taunting about "Egypt's hiding behind the U.N. Emergency
Force (UNEF) in Sinai" eventually forced Nasir to request
the withdrawal of the UNEF and close the Straits of Tiran
to Israeli shipping.
Israel's overwhelming victory starkly revealed the inade-
quacies of the Arab armies, especially the Egyptian Army.
Nasir 's actual policy of moderation toward Israel before 1967
gave way to the militant public rhetoric that had long been
emanating from Radio Cairo and the Egyptian press . Nasir
turned inward to domestic problems, despite his desire to
regain captured lands. Nasir was forced to rely on the
Soviets to rebuild the military, and to demonstrate the
latent dangers of the stalemated truce. Nasir launched the
War of Attrition, which he kept on a manageable scale, but
by escalating the level of violence, Nasir secured superpower
interest. In January of 19 70, Nasir finally secured surface-
to-air missiles and Soviet crews to man them in an attempt
to raise the stakes to a level that would result in a Soviet
and American-sponsored ceasefire [Heikal 1978, pp. 191-8]
.
The War of Attrition ended with the ceasefire agreed upon
in August, 19 70.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War demonstrated military weaknesses
and restricted the military's political influence. Initially,
Nasir accepted full blame for the 1967 disaster, but retracted
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his statement and demanded the resignations of 30 senior
officers [Smith 1977
, p. 49] . Field Marshall Amer, Minister
of War Badran, and seven of the eight full generals resigned.
A purge of over 300 officers followed. Nasir directed a
reorganization of the armed forces, a significant increase in
their size, and enhanced the role of Soviet experts by
72insisting that their advice was binding. The War of
Attrition did little to restore the reputation of the mili-
tary as a competent fighting force.
3. Military Intelligence and Security
In his autobiography, In Search of Identity , Anwar
al-Sadat stated:
By nature Nasser tended to suspect others ... .Worse
yet, as a result of his preoccupation with "security"
and of the doubts that preyed on his mind, regrettably,
grave mistakes were committed in Egypt against man's
humanity [Sadat 1977, pp. 90-91]
.
With the primary purpose of insuring his regime, Nasir
established an intricate intelligence and internal security
network complete with concentration camps, incidence of
73torture, and widespread repression. The security apparatus,
in comparison to other ministries in which ex-officers were
72Soviet advisers reportedly took increasing control
in selection and promotion of officers. George Haddad,
Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East; The Arab
States (New York: Spiller, 1973), p. 139.
73 . . .For a brief description of the concentration camps
under the Minister of Military Prisons see Anwar Abdel-Malek,





employed, was predominately military. By 1961, more than
3,400 of the 4,100 employees in the Ministry of the Interior
were either active or retired military officers [Hurewitz
1969, p. 134]. The Ministry of the Interior, with its 20,000-
man Republican Guard, was controlled by Free Officer Gum 'a
during much of Nasir's reign. All police functions were
placed under the Ministry of the Interior in 1952 under a
Police Reform Law [Nyrop 1976, p. 337]. Yet, this was only
one of five major organizations: others included the Ministry
of Presidential Affairs (secret service) under Sami Sharaf;
the security section of the War Ministry; the General Intelli-
gence Department under Salah Nasir with purview over intelli-
gence collection, counter-espionage and special operations;
and a large political intelligence branch in the Arab Socialist
74
Union (ASU) after its founding in 1962. In addition, intelli-
gence and security functions were performed by the Ministry
of Information and the branches of the armed forces under
the War Ministry. All these organizations reported directly
through their chiefs to Nasir, except the services of the War
Ministry and subordinate elements, which reported to Amer.
The number of agencies itself indicates the prominence of
the internal security function, reliance upon a system of
checks and balances, and upon the multiplicity of sources in
74See Nyrop, p. 353; John Waterbury, Egypt: Burdens of
the Past, Options for the Future (Bloomington : Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1978) , p~. 238; and R. Michael Burrell and
Abbas Kelidar, "Egypt: The Dilemma of a Nation," The
Washington Papers , 5, 48 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977) , p. 14
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intelligence gathering. Political opposition discovered by
these agencies was normally curtailed with little information
released in the press; however, potential opposition within
the military was handled by transfer of position, service
in the diplomatic corps, etc., evidently a policy upon which
Nasir and Amer concurred. Nasir explained the policy on
this basis:
If I begin purging the army, I run the risk of alien-
ating big blocks of men. In the end, I would undermine
my own position and invite a coup d 'etat against my
regime [Wynn 1959, p. 61].
Coordination between the agencies was unlikely. One
incident among three services arose in 1965 out of a military
intelligence report of a vast network of communist infil-
trators in the ASU youth group; 75 arrests resulted. Nasir
ordered the Minister of the Interior to investigate the
charges independently; they were not confirmed. Nasir then
ordered the prisoners released and reinstated [Mahfouz 1972,
p. 193]
.
The GID is the agency usually considered responsible
for intelligence gathering and special operations abroad,
including the subversion and overthrow of governments. Nasir
was suspected of having agents operating at various times in
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. A
related subversive technique initiated by Nasir to oppose
Iraq's entrance into the Baghdad Pact was his policy of talk-
ing directly to the people through radio and press, bypassing
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the head of state completely. This technique became more
widespread in the name of Arab unity and was finally justi-
fied as policy by Heikal in 1962 as part of the Arab revolu-
tion in which all peoples formed one nation. The lasting
detriment of this policy was explained by Kerr:
It means that every Arab leader needs to bend his
words and visible actions toward a non-existent state
of affairs. .. .It means every Arab state's affairs
becomes the legitimate business of every other's
[Kerr 1972, p. 31]
.
4 . Military Role in the Bureaucracy
The ineffectivenss of the Egyptian bureaucracy did
not begin with the infusion of the military into civil ser-
vice; however, corruption and inefficiency have expanded
with the growth of the bureaucracy from a size of one-quarter
million in 1952 to over a million by 1970 [Nyrop 1976,
p. 173] . The prominence of officers at the upper levels of
the bureaucracy was merely sumptomatic: "the army came to
represent for Nasir a personal pool for far-reaching extra-
military tasks" [Baker 1978, p. 55]. About one thousand
officers had entered into crucial economic and administra-
tive positions by 196 7, and provided "the majority of ministers,
provincial governors, ambassadors and newspaper editors in
Egypt" [Be'eri 1970, p. 429]. The effect of the military
within the bureaucracy was to stabilize Nasir 's regime
administratively and to insure the military's domination for
appropriations. Nonetheless, their performance within the
bureaucracy has not been militaristic or unresponsive to
non-military requirements [Berger 1960, p. 21].
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Those who view the bureaucracy as a non-political,
"tightly controlled structure" fail to explain the continued
inadequacies of the civil service in implementing specific
75
projects directed by Nasir personally. The influential
view of James Heapley is that the elites viewed Egypt as
a large organization in which rapid economic development
was administered rather than politically promoted [Heapley
1966]. The state, it is argued, was oriented toward solving
problems of the state, as opposed to a political concept
in which the state would solve the problems of conflicting
interests through reconciliation.
While this explanation is instructive, it assumes
that governmental decrees or proclamations are important in
Egyptian domestic politics, and does not consider the number
of proclamations that are made post- facto , to provide credi-
bility for actions that were taken on a pragmatic basis. An
explanation that does not consider rival political elements
within the bureaucracy itself and one that excludes the
considerable stature, if not influence, of personally appointed
clients, is oversimplified. In a political system that
maximized the need to maintain favor with Nasir, leading
bureaucrats could be easily exposed as ineffective by rivals
who used their institutional followings to thwart the programs
of their opponents. Heikal indicated that rival centers of
75




power within the civil service were a cause of tension in
76
the regime's relationship with the bureaucracy. Baker's
analysis of the bureaucracy accounts for rival power within
the expanding state apparatus and within new organizations
created by Nasir. He describes the various elements as
fiefdoms in an overall system he calls "bureaucratic
feudalism" [Baker 1978, pp. 71-89].
Nasir created several new independent administrative
structures including the Council for Production, Ministry
of Industry, Economic Organization, Suez Canal Authority,
High Dam Organization, and Organization for Land Improvement
and Desert Reclamation. These bodies were staffed with
competent technocrats with backgrounds in engineering, economics,
etc., and have been the most usccessful organizations in
achieving their modernization goals. A similar trend was
established to fill leading roles within the public sector,
and after the nationalizations in the early sixties, thirty-
eight public corporations were formed. All but one were
headed by competent civilian managers with doctorates [Baker
1978, p. 179] . This trend toward reliance on technocrats
is best described as a trend toward efficiency, not inde-
pendence, since Nasir retained control of top-level appoint-
ments. The early emphasis upon military manpower was later
modified for the sake of efficiency. The level of institutional
76A1-Ahram, 13 March 1964.
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military influence within the bureaucracy is difficult to
determine, because of two counteracting developments which
began in the 1960's.
In 1962, employment of all university graduates
within the government was guaranteed by law, resulting in
the unnecessary overstaffing of governmental structures, but
reducing the level of institutional military influence within
the bureaucracy. At this time, many Egyptians viewed the
military as a stepping stone to lucrative posts in the
bureaucracy. The military has fostered this trend by encouraging
officers to undertake training in nonmilitary subjects. Many
officers were detached from active duty to attend universi-
ties, and in 1961, the military established a military-technical
institute with a "seven-year curriculum designed to train
managerial staffs " [Malik 1968, p. 176]. While these policies
promoted movement into the civilian fields, they also empha-
sized the trend toward efficiency.
5. Military as a Competing Center of Political Power
By the late 1950' s Nasir had become increasingly dis-
illusioned with the bureaucracy and the National Union. After
the Syrian secession when socialist ideology was officially
pronounced, Nasir decided to launch the "new socialist direc-
tion" through a mobilization party. In the wake of the new
socialist decrees, Nasir reportedly had his first serious
encounter with Amer, who felt the decrees were "disquieting
to the Army" [Baker 1978, p. 92]. Shans Badran corroborated
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this view during his trial in 1968 (Badran was tried for
treason in attempting to reinstate Amer after Nasir removed
him subsequent to the 1967 defeat) , when he said Nasir
wanted to restrict Amer's total control (possibly through
the ASU) of the army, and that Amer threatened resignation,
77
which Nasir could not afford to accept. Heikal explained
in Al Ahram that "in 1962 there was a peaceful coup d'etat .
From the time of that coup the state powers began to suffer
78from a phenomenon of pluralism." Sadat has claimed that
"Amer actually wanted to take over" and that Nasir told him
that he was worried about Amer's hold on the military [Sadat
1978, pp. 168-169], It would seem that Amer and Nasir had
reached an understanding, since there were no other documented
disagreements between them until after the 1967 defeat.
A rivalry developed between Amer and Ali Sabri, a
leftist appointed by Nasir as Secretary-General of the ASU
in 1965. Sabri established a hierarchy of authority within
the party by ending direct elections and establishing a sys-
tem of appointing party cadre. Amer voiced his dissatis-
faction with the ASU in 1965, attacking the basic principle
79
of the one-party system. The reactions of the technocratic
77See the account of the trial by E. Primakov, "March
30 Program," New Times 17 (1968): 5.
78 See Heikals ' editorial in Al-Ahram , April 5, 1968.
Trans, available in JPRS .
79A1-Tali'a, March 1965, pp. 9-26.
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elite and the Ministry of the Interior also challenged the
ASU, which was gaining increased power relative to the other
centers of power. The rivalry between centers of power
was reflected in a series of over one hundred articles
published by Sabri in Al-Gumhuriyyah before the war in 1967.
The articles attacked technocrats, highly placed bureaucrats,
and the military. In an article written in March of 1967,
Sabri called for an increased political role for soldiers
and policemen. The infighting continued until the demise
of Amer in 1967 and Sabri in 1971.
Nasir's utilization of th ASU as the "new vanguard
of the revolution" (previously Nasir referred to the Army
in this manner) to oppose the bureaucratic and military
centers of power eventually grew to be a significant challenge
in itself. By the autumn of 1967, Nasir's proclamations
regarding the ASU claimed that it was being exploited as a
base for rival political power.
The allusion to client-patron politics among Nasir,
Sabri, and Amer indicates that the Army has played another
significant role in Egypt, as a rival center of political
power. Nasir was placed in a precarious situation regarding
the military: not only was the military the guarantor of
his regime, but also the element most capable of supplanting
him. Nasir's political liability in accepting Amer ' s resignation
80A1-Ahram, 11 August 19 67.
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in 1962 was based on Amer' s personal control of other
powerful leaders in the military. Nasir attempted to
balance conflict between Amer and Sabri so as to strengthen
his own position. Nasir did not become the captive of the
military or the ASU, but he was dependent on several key
clients, who became increasingly difficult for him to control
B. SADAT'S REGIME: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE
The position of the military toward Sadat's "Western-
directed" policies has been generally supportive, but not
without incidents . The first sign of discontent was a pub-
lic demonstration in Cairo staged by officers from the Third
Army in January of 1974, who protested the first disengage-
ment agreement. Several officers were arrested, and the
commanders of the Second and Third Armies dismissed. A
rebellion occurred among cadets at the military academy in
April of 1974, but opposition became more substantial when
the Soviets suspended arms deliveries in July [Burrell and
Kelidar 1977, p. 25] . The second disengagement agreement
led to the arrest of several officers for conspiring against
the regime, and the chief of the Army Intelligence Service,
Abdel Tawfiq, whose service did not uncover the plot, was
dismissed in September of 1975. The major military opponent
of the Camp Daid peace process has been ex-army commander,
General Shadhili, now head of the opposition's National




Despite these incidents/ the military has provided firm
support for Sadat's peace initiative. Nonetheless, Sadat's
exhaustive attempts to solicit Western arms and the first
priority accorded to defense in the 1979 budget indicate
that continued support will largely depend on Sadat's ability
to acquire sufficient quantities of sophisticated arms for
81
the military. This need has been exacerbated by the
massive Soviet resupply of arms to Syria after the October
War, and by more recent deliveries to Libya. In the spring
of 1976 Sadat held a series of meetings with senior air
force and navy commanders who had complained about the lack
of spare parts. According to a western military source, he
82did not calm their fears.
During Sadat's trip to Washington in May of 1977, he
secured a $200 million arms package (transport and observa-
tion aircraft, and communications equipment) , and in July,
the U.S. administration announced approval for the training
8 3
of Egyptian officers in the U.S. These first assurances
of U.S. military support were far short of the desires of the
Egyptian military, but Senate approval in May 1978, of the
81Defense is specified in the 1979 Financial and Economic
Plan as the government's first priority expenditure. Al-Ahram
al-Iqtisadi , 1 February 1979, pp. 1-62, Trans, in JPRS , 4
April 1979.
82New York Times , November 20, 1979, p. 16.
83
"U.S. Weaponry for the Egyptian Army," Middle East
Intelligence Survey 7 (16-31 July, 1979): 61.
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"package deal," which included fifty F-5E jet fighters for
Egypt, was a substantial victory for Sadat. In the Autumn
of 1978, Egypt signed an agreement with China to provide
spare parts and forty outdated MIG-19 fighter aircraft, but
more significantly, reached agreement during the Camp David
talks on a large-scale supply of arms credits from the U.S.,
84
estimated at $1.5 billion. Defense Secretary Harold Brown
announced this credit in March of 1979 as a "new military
support arrangement with Egypt," and twelve F-4 Phantom fighter-
bombers were delivered in time for Egypt's annual military
85
review in October of 1979. Egyptian domestic arms produc-
tion has been slowed by the withdrawal of Arab state support
for the Arab Organization for Industrialization; however,
Egypt has formed its own organization, EOI, and had announced
that it will continue co-production agreements under con-
tract with the U.S., France, and Britain. In January of
1980, the Carter Administration decided to supply Egypt with
more sophisticated U.S. weapons including an estimated 40
86F-16s or 24 F-15s and M60A3 tanks. Carter has asked Con-
gress to approve $350 million in loans in FY81 and $800 million
in FY82 to finance these purchases. Despite a slow start,
84An-Nahar Arab Report and Memo , November 27, 1978, p. 3.
Aircraft were delivered by June 19 79 when another agreement
was reached for forty additional MIG-19* s. See An-Nahar
Arab Report and Memo , July 2, 1979.
85Christian Science Monitor , March 23, 1979, p. 2 and An-
Nahar Arab Report and Memo , March 26, 1979, p. 3.
q c.




Sadat has been able to deliver the Western arms and spare
parts demanded by the military. Future support of the mili-
tary will in large measure depend on his continued ability
to provide the military with modern weaponry.
In 1971, Sadat dismantled the intelligence and security
apparatus within the ASU and dramatically burned tape record-
ings in public [Binder 1978, p. 392]. It is also likely
that similar organizations within the Ministry of Informa-
tion have been dissolved; however, the GID, secret service,
military intelligence department, and the intelligence and
security sections of the Ministry of the Interior remain
intact. It appears that Sadat has established increased
centralized control over these agencies, since they have
recognizably modified their previous modus operandi , and
now have a rather low profile. Operations vigorously
continue under new leadership appointed by Sadat in all
four agencies, but the repressive techniques common during
Nasir's regime have been much less pronounced. The most
recent State Department Report on Human Rights, released in
February of 1979, states:
In 1970 President Sadat succeeded the extremely
authoritarian Nasir regime. Repudiating its ex-
cesses, he sharply curbed the activities of the secret
police, has permitted greatly increased freedom of
expression and set a course of liberalization in the
political, economic and social spheres of Egyptian
life. Torture is strictly forbidden under Egyptian law
and to the best of the Department of State's knowl-
edge has not recently been practiced. .. .Arbitrary arrest
and imprisonment no longer take place. 87
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"U.S. Rights Survey for 115 Countries Sees Some Progress,"
New York Times , February 11, 1979, p. 1, and associated
story on p. 16.

Military officer access to the highest civilian govern-
ment positions under Sadat has been reduced, limited essen-
tially to cabinet ministries of war, war production, and
positions within the foreign service ministry. Table I
indicates the reduction in direct military involvement
88
within the cabinet. However, this reduction should not
be equated with reduced military influence.
Cabinet Mil.itary Cabinet Mil itary Cabinet Military
of N % of N % of N %
1952 1 6 1964 16 36 1973 9 30
1953 9 41 1965 19 46 1974 6 21
1954 12 52 1966 21 55 1976 6 20
1956 8 36 1968 13 42 1978 6 18
1958 8 38 1970 12 36 1979 5 17
1961 16 52 1971 11 37 1980 4 15
1962 17 47 1972 7 22
Table I. MILITARY COMPONENTS OF EGYPTIAN CABINETS
Sadat's vice-president is ex-Air Force Commander Husni
Mubarak. While Sadat has continued Nasir's style of direct
appointments into high-level bureaucratic and managerial
positions, he has appointed civilian technocrats. In
launching the infitah policy, Sadat turned to the educated
elite, to such men as Aziz Higazi, Abdel-Kaissouny , Hamed
Sayeh, and Abdel-Meguid. While Nasir relied on civilian
Table for years 1952-19 72 adapted from Shahrough Akhavi,
"Egypt: Neo-Patrimonial Elite,: in Political Elites and
Political Development in the Middle East , ed. by Frank
Tachau (New York: John Wiley, 1975) , p. 91.
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managers within many public sector corporations, Sadat has
expanded their predominance in remaining public sector
companies [Baker 1978, p. 179]. Sadat's economic reforms
have also produced a resurgence of the former ancien regime
within the private sector, although their access to politi-
cal power is limited. To date, the main benefactors of
Sadat's "opening" have been the emerging technocratic elite.
Students and military officers continue to move into mid-level
jobs within the bureaucracy, and Sadat's rule has not signi-
ficantly improved its efficiency.
In his relationship with the military, Sadat has tried
to limit its potential for exercising autonomous political
power, yet enhancing its reputation symbolically and
materially. Sadat has exploited the success of the October
War to restore the prestige of the military with the public,
and then has sought to exploit that renewed prestige to
enhance his own position. After the October War, the entire
military command was called to a special commemorative session
of the Peoples' Assembly, during which Sadat, in full military
dress, deocrated leading officers and honored the dead. Sadat
staged a massive military parade in October of 1974, the
first since 1967, and has continued these parades annually
to commemorate the success of the October War. Senior military
commanders are always promoted publicly during special
sessions of the assembly.
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The most recent series of promotions, in May of 19 79,
89indicated another aspect of Sadat's technique. As lead-
ing military figures are removed from positions of importance,
they are retained in unofficial capacities such as presiden-
tial advisers. Promotion of such advisers as General Gamasi
and General Fahmi is designed to maintain their loyalty and
allow Sadat the option of reappointing them to more active
90 ...positions. Sadat has used military prestige in announcing
major policies and critical decisions, such as the replace-
ment of the last RCC member, Hussein Shafi, with Husni
Mubarak in 1975. A more recent example is the great prominence
given to the military backing Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in
1977. The words of incumbent Commander-in-Chief Gamasi were
widely quoted:
The armed forces are aware of the dimensions and
responsibilities of the present situation, and are
closely watching your courageous step toward a just
peace. So march ahead, Mr. President, with the
blessings of God, and you have, from all members
of the armed forces, greetings, esteem, and prayers
for success [Baker, 1978, p. 153].
C. THE MILITARY AS A CONDITIONAL GUARDIAN
The role of the military in Egypt has changed both in
scope and degree since the coup d'etat in 1952. These changes
have not been limited to the Sadat era, nor have they been
8 9
"Al-Sadat Promotes Military Personnel , " Cairo News
Service , May 26, 1979. Translation in FBIS , May 29, 1979,
p. D-21.




so dramatic as to eliminate previous functions or add new
ones. The early years of Nasir's reign were indeed prae-
torian. Through direct military rule and a massive infusion
of military elites into positions of leadership throughout
the society, Nasir established firm personal control. Yet,
as Nasir sought to implement his goals of forced moderniza-
tion, the ruling military elite became less unitary, and
civilian technocrats with needed expertise became more
necessary and prevalent. By the early 1960 's, a mixed civil-
military elite had emerged, still strongly controlled by
Nasir through personal ties. The military remained a dominant
influence that Nasir eventually sought to contain through his
personal control and through rival centers of power, including
an extensive intelligence and security apparatus and the
Arab Socialist Union under Ali Sabri.
The trend toward less reliance upon the military as a
source of elite manpower became more prounounced under Sadat.
His policy of infitah required increased reliance upon compe-
tent, educated elites. Technocrat, professional, and indus-
trialist access into positions of influence is continuing,
so that the current regime is best characterized as a civil-
military coalition, which includes technocrats, medium
landholders and officers, all of whom remain under Sadat's
personal control.
Nasir relied upon the military and his intricate security
apparatus to insure his regime and to actively repress his
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opposition. Sadat established increased control over the
security apparatus and reduced its overt excesses. The func-
tion of insuring the regime by the military and security
apparatus continues, but with a new low-key emphasis.
Nasir sought to establish a powerful army and relied
upon its prestige in inter-Arab politics. Pursuit of advanced
weaponry became essential to Nasir 's foregin policy. The
symbolic use of Egypt's military prowess eventually gave
way to military intervention and finally to war with Israel
in 196 7. Sadat's success in rebuilding the military into
a competent fighting force was essential to his continued
reign. The October War was Sadat's salvation since it estab-
lished his prestige and restored Egypt's honor, a necessary
precondition to any peace settlement. The success of Sadat's
strategy of turning to the West to solve Egypt's economic
problems in no small way depends upon his ability to maintain
the military as a well-equipped, modern force. Sadat is
keeping the army busy with expanded development projects such
as road building and land reclamation, but senior professional




91Since 19 74, the public development functions of the
military have expanded. Projects such as the development
of public works, road and engineering projects, reclamation
of land and irrigation projects continue to keep the army
busy. See Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and
Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 153.
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In the last years of his regime, Nasir was challenged
by the military as a separate center of political power.
Sadat's technique of rotating powerful military leaders
before they became powerful enough to effect his removal
is apparent. Sadat has actively pursued a policy of pro-
fessional, non-political development within the military,
and has reduced the number of key military personnel within
the cabinet. The continued success of this delicate balancing
act is dependent upon Sadat's ability to keep the military
satisfied and upon adept perceptions regarding the limits
of his independence.
At a minimum, Sadat will need to insure the continued
supply of sophisticated arms in the requisite number and
to obtain at least acquiescence from key military leaders on
major policy decisions. The continued enhancement of the
prestige of the officer corps through perquisites and public
deference is expected to continue.
The solidarity of the Egyptian military should not be
over-emphasized, and the watchful eye of the intelligence
and security apparatus must remain open. In today's Egypt,
Sadat's power retains a very personal face and depends upon




The application of political culture as a framework for
the study of politics in Egypt is essential for proper under-
standing, because political culture provides some answers
about why things are different in this particular state. The
prominence of family and Islamic tradition remain at the
heart of Egyptian politics. Factors such as education,
urbanization/ industrialization and migration have certainly
affected domestic politics, but their effects can best be
understood by determining how they modify traditional bases
of authority to produce an observable result. The family is
no longer the sole basis for prestige and status, yet family
and personal relationships remain the core units of politi-
cal action. Egyptian political culture has a restrictive
and directive quality, not only upon the masses, but also
upon the ruling elite.
The one-party system established by the post-revolutionary
regime has modified traditional authority patterns and levels
of political participation. The changes that resulted from
the removal of the top level of the ancien regime were much
more significant at subnational level. New government and
party positions created a demand for additional political
representation. Initially, these institutional positions
were not politically important, but they did provide office-




increase their stature and influence through access to
higher level influentials . This exposure was contained at
the national level, but allowed to flourish at a subnational
level. The establishment of the Arab Socialist Union in
1962 with its corporative structure again increased the
scope of the politically active. When the ASU was abruptly
reformed into a mobilization party in the mid-1960s, the
consequence at local level was to further expand the scope
of participation. While these changes in participation
levels are significant in terms of elite access, the nature
of participation remained basically the same. Both at the
national and subnational level, family relationships, asso-
ciatinal ties, inter-family marriages and patron-client net-
works retained their importance. The traditional umdah system
had certainly undergone some cosmetic change, but the tra-
ditional participants have retained their linkage with the
central government and remain Egypt's "second stratem."
Political party structures have not been significant in
political socialization except for a brief period during the
mobilization program of Ali Sabri. Egypt's party system
has been more relevant for political development at the sub-
national level where a degree of autonomy developed and rein-
forced the influence of traditional ledaders under the re-
gimes of both Nasir and Sadat. The increase in political
awareness and participation should not be confused with evo-
lutionary democratic growth despite the official rhetoric.
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Democracy is based on sharing power , loyal opposition and
majority rule. These concepts are alien to a polity whose
political culture is based on centralized control, mistrust,
reciprocities and ingroup-outgroup rivalries.
A second basic level of political development can be
determined by analyzing the degree to which the official
ideology has penetrated the political culture. The case
studies of villages referenced throughout this study show
that the average fellah recognizes such terms as socialism,
Arab nationalism and infitah , but that he relates the offi-
cial ideology only in terms of the "good works" that affect
him personally and locally through his family, his religion,
his status, his occupation and his stomach. Only with such
things as a new school, a better road or continued food
subsidies, can he identify. The Egyptian political culture
has predisposed the masses to resist efforts at mobilization,
whether directed by an authoritarian leader and his brand
of revolutionary ideology or a patrimonial leader under the
guise of pluralism.
Institutions provide a third focus. Institutional par-
ticipation levels provide the highest degree of known politi-
cal involvement as evidenced through membership in political
parties, cooperatives, unions and various other associations;
however, this level of analysis is the least meaningful in
respect to Egyptian political culture for several reasons.
First of all, institutions are merely arenas in which
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politically relevant interpersonal relationships develop.
Families, associational ties and inter-family marriage con-
tinue to cement political support. Unfortunately, the
institutional level of analysis is the most open to analysis;
it is the level that has been most often researched, despite
the fact that such institutions are foreign to the political
culture.
The fourth level of analysis is the extent of extra-
legal participation, which provides an understanding of cer-
92tain aspects of the political culture. This category
includes organized ideological movements such as the Muslim
Brethren and the Communist Party, factional outgroup move-
ments such as the National Front and mass demonstrations of
dissatisfaction with the government. The conspiratorial
nature of these opposition groups is as much a part of the
political culture as is the leadership's refusal to share
political power. Such groups have the same non-institutional
bases for control as do the supportive political institutions
of the regime. Such groups are incapable of functional loyal
opposition.
Nasir had a limited number of powerful clients who gained
considerable autonomy within their own center of power.
Eventually, they became powerful enough to restrict Nasir'
s
control. As Waterbury aptly noted, "the true brilliance of
92
This type of participation is discussed in detail in
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies




Sadat's performance is that he gives the impression of not
running the show" [Waterbury 1975, p. 15]. Sadat's method of
control is also based on personal loaylties, but they are
intentionally less permanent than Nasir's had been. Having
had the advantage of observing Nasir's regime over a long
period of time, it is. likely that Sadat realized one of its
major internal weaknesses: strong powerful personalities
such as Amer, Sabri, Gum 'a and Sharaf tend to develop their
own loyal supporters and as such, become increasingly
difficult to control. Sadat's style of personal control is
characterized by decentralizing rivalries institutionally,
rotation of powerful elites from their locus of power, and
strong control of the military and security apparatus.
Sadat's "state of institutions" consists of the executive,
the press, the assembly, the party system, the bureaucracy
and the military. Each institution is organizationally weak
and lacks unity of effort; rivals within each institution
are permitted, in fact, encouraged to in-fight by Sadat's
personal assignment of key competing figures; and each
institution is closely monitored, so that when individuals
become strong, they are spotted early, and if necessary,
replaced. The system allows for Sadat's control without his
direct involvement, and it provides a healthy watchdog effect
of policy scrutiny within each institution. Such an under-
standing of Sadat's concept of control, while certainly incom-
plete and problematic, does provide plausible explanations
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for many of Sadat's otherwise incomprehensible personnel
changes. The military provides such examples. General
Sadiq and General Nassif secured Sadat's position in the Ali
Sabri episode in 1971, but in his new position as Minister
of War, Sadiq became a strong potential threat and was dis-
missed. The appointment of Air Force General Husni Mubarak
as vice-president over Genral Gamasi, one of the planners
of the 19 73 War, provides another example where the stronger
individual was removed to a position of less access (adviser
to the president) . Similar fate befell Prime Minister Salim,
who was replaced by Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil in 1979.
Rival influentials could be found in several institutions and
ministrires, such as Mubarak and Khalil in the executive,
93
and Boutros Ghali and Usama Bazz in the Foreign Ministry.
Sadat has expanded the arena of political influence by pro-
moting activity in the assembly, among professional syndi-
cates, technocrats and industrialists and within the party
system; however, the function of these groups in decision-
making is limited to interest articulation and restricted
to their particular sphere of influence. Through his system
of personnel management, techniques such as the May 1978
referendum, and low-key intelligence and security operations,
Sadat maintains personal control. Sadat's latest cabinet
reshuffle of May 1980 in which he assumed the position of
9 3See "All the President's Men," Middle East Intelligence
Survey, 16-30 April 1979, pp. 12-13.
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prime minister and elevated the status of General Kamal
Hassan Ali and Ali Abdel-Meguid, demonstrates Sadat's need
to assert more positive control. While Sadat has attempted
to stay "above politics" in the tradition of Tunisia's
Bourguiba and prefers to direct his clientage without con-
tinuous personal involvement, Egypt's worsening domestic
problems have and will continue to force an occasional
reassertion of his outward, personal and direct control.
Sadat's policies, like those of Nasir, must carefully defer
to the values of the political culture, strongly represented




Adams, Charles C, Islam and Modernism in Egypt , New York:
Russell, 1968.
Ahmad, Yusuf J., Absorptive Capacity of the Egyptian Economy
,
Paris: OECD, 1976.
Ajami, Fouad, "The End of Pan-Arabism, " Foreign Affairs
(Winter, 1978-1979): 355-373.
Akhavi, Shahrough, "Egypt: Neo-Patrimonial Elite," In
Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle
East
, pp. 69-113. Edited by Frank Tachau. New York:
John Wiley, 1975.
Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham, Comparative
Politics: System, Process and Policy , 2d ed., Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1978.
Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture
,
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963.
Almond, Gabriel A., "Comparative Political Systems," Journal
of Politics 18 (August, 1956): 391-409.
Ammar, Hamed, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village , London:
Oxford, 1954.
Amos, John W. II, Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations
,
New York: Pergamon, 19 79.
Antoun, Richard T., Low-Key Politics: Local-Level Leadership
and Change in the Middle East , Albany: State Univ. 6T
New York Press, 1979.
Antoun, Richard T. and Harik, Iliya F., ed., Rural Politics
and Social Change in the Middle East , Bloommgton:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1972
.
Arab Press Service Diplomat .
Arab Report and Memo .
Arab World Weekly .
Araby, Mohammed al, An Outline of Local Government in the
United Arab Republic , Cairo: Gov't Press, 1962.
127

Askari, Hossein and Cummings, John T., Middle East Economies
in the 1970s , New York: Praeger, 1976.
Ayrout, Henry Habib, The Egyptian Peasant , Boston: Beacon
Press, 1963.
Baer, Gabriel, Studies in the Social History of Modern Egypt
,
Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969
.
Baer, Gabriel, "The Beginnings of Municipal Government in
Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 4 (January, 1968):
118-140.
Baer, Gabriel, "The Village Shaykh in Modern Egypt (1800-
1950)," In Studies in Islamic History , Edited by Uriel
Heyd. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961.
Baker, Raymond W., Egypt's Uncertain Revolution Under Nasser
and Sadat , Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1978.
Be'eri, Eliezer, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society ,
New York: Praeger, 19 70.
Bell, Bowyer, J., "National Character and Military Strategy:
The Egyptian Experience," Parameters V, 1 (1975): 6-16.
Ben-Dor, Gabriel, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East
Politics," International Journal of Middle East Studies
8 (January, 19 77) : 43-63.
Ben-Dor, Gabriel, "Civilianization of Military Regimes in
the Arab World." In Political Participation Under
Military Regimes
, pp. 39-4 9. Edited by Henry Bienen and
David Morell. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.
Berger, Morroe, Islam in Egypt Today , Cambridge: Harvard
Press, 1970.
Berger, Morroe, The Arab World Today , New York: Doubleday,
1962.
Berger, Morroe, Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt
Since Napoelon , Research Monograph No. 6, Center for
International Studies: Princeton Univ., 1960.
Berque, Jacques, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution , Trans.
by Jean Stewart, New York: Praeger, 1972.
Berque, Jacques, Cultural Expression in Arab Society Today ,




Bezirgan, Najm A., "Islam and Arab Nationalism," Middle East
Review 11 (Winter, 1978-1979): 38-44.
Bill, James A. and Leiden, Carl, Politics in the Middle East
,
Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19 79.
Binder, Leonard, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power
and the Second Stratem in Egypt , Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1978.
Binder, Leonard, ed., Crises and Sequences in Political
Development , Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971.
Binder, Leonard, "Egypt: The Integrative Revolution,"
In Political Culture and Political Development
,
pp. 396-449. Edited by Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba,
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.
Binder, Leonard, "Political Recruitment and Participation in
Egypt," In Political Parties and Political Development
,
pp. 217-240. Edited by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron
Weiner, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966.
Bishara, Ghassan, "Middle East Plane Package," Journal of
Palestine Studies 7,4 (1978): 67-78.
Borthwick, Bruce M. , "Religion and Politics in Israel and
Egypt," Middle East Journal 33 (Spring, 1979): 145-163.
Brodin, Eric, "The Christian in Egypt," Plural Societies
(Netherlands) 9,1 (1978): 75-83.
Burrell, Michael R. and Kelidar, Abbas, "Egypt: Dilemmas
of a Nation: 1970-1977," Washington Papers V, 48, Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1977.
Buttner, Friedemann, "Political Stability Without Stable
Institutions: The Retraditionalization of Egypt's
Policy," Orient (Hamburg) 20 (March, 1979): 53-67.
Cairo Domestic News Service .
Cantori, Louis J., "Egypt at Peace," Current History 78
(January, 1980): 26-29, 38.
Carre, Oliver, "L ' Ideologie Politico-religieuse Nasserienne
a la lumiere des manuels scolaires," Politique Etrangere
(Paris) 37 (1972): 536-546.




Chejne, A.G., "The Use of History by Modern Arab Writers,"
Middle East Journal 14,4 (1960): 382-396.
Choucri, Nazli and Eckhaus, Richard S., "Interactions of
Economic and Political Change: The Egyptian Case,"
World Development 7 (1979): 783-797.
Christian Science Monitor .
Clarity, James F., "Egyptians in Relatively Free Voting
Elect Assembly," New York Times , 29 October 1976.
Copeland, Miles, The Game of Nations , London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1969.
Dawisha, A.I., Egypt in the Arab World , New York: John Wiley,
1976.
Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Patterns of Political Leadership:
Lebanon, Israel, Egypt , Albany: State Univ. of New
York Press, 1975.
Dekmejian, R. Hrair, Egypt Under Nasir , Albany: State Univ.
of New York Press, 1971.
Dellalfar, William and Pack, Howard, "Economic Benefits of
Peace in the Middle East," Middle East Review 11 (Spring,
1979): 10-18.
Dessouki, Ali. ed., "Democracy in Egypt," Cairo Papers in
Social Science , I, 2, Cairo: AUC, 1978.
Dessouki, Ali, "Mass Political Culture of Egypt," Muslim World
61 (January, 1971): 13-20.
Deutsch, Karl W. , "Social Mobilization and Political Develop-
ment," American Political Science Review 55 (September,
1961): 493-514.
"Egyptian Financial and Economic Policy for 1979," Al-Ahram




Elsheik, Ibrahim, Mass Media and Ideological Change in
Egypt (1950-1973) , Amsterdam: Univ. of Amsterdam
Press, 1977.
Entelis, J. P., "Nasser's Egypt: Failure of Charismatic
Leadership," Orbis 18 (Summer, 1974): 451-464.
Fakhouri, Hani, Kafr el-Elow: An Egyptian Village in
Transition , New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972.
130

Fernea, Robert A., "Gaps in the Ethnographic Literature on
the Middle East Village," In Rural Politics and Social
Change in the Middle East
, pp. 75-102, Edited by Richard
T. Antoun and Iliya F. Harik, Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 1972.
Finnegan, Phil, "Muslim Violence Against Copts Poses Problems
for Egypt," Christian Science Monitor , 3 March 1980.
Flanz, Gisbert H. and Blaustein, Albert, Constitutions of
the World; Egypt , New York: Oceana, 1972.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service .
Gellner, Ernest and Waterbury, John, ed., Patrons and Clients
in Mediterranean Societies , London: Duckworth, 19 77.
Ghali, Mirrit Boutros, "The Egyptian National Consciousness,"
Middle East Journal 32 (Winter, 1978): 59-77.
Gilsenan, Michael, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt , New York:
Oxford, 1974.
Haddad, George, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle
East: The Arab States , New York: Spiller, 1973.
Hakim, Tawfiq al, Under the Sun of Thought , Cairo, 1938.
Hakim, Tawfiq al, Return of Awareness , Beirut, 1974.
Halpern, Manfred, Political and Social Change in the Middle
East and North Africa, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press,
TttT.
Hanson, Bent, "Arab Socialism in Egypt," World Development
3 (April 1975): 201-211.
Harik, Iliya F., Political Mobilization of Peasants: Study
of an Egyptian Village , Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1974.
Harik, Iliya F., "The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement,"
World Politics 26 (Obtober, 1973): 80-105.
Harik, Iliya P., "Opinion Leaders," American Political Science
Review 6 5 (September, 1971): 731-740.
Harris, Christina Phelps, Nationalism and Revolution in




Hassan, Mohammed Lufti, "Village in Abishna," Al-Tali 'a ,
September 1966, p. 42.
Heaphey, James, "Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a
Non-political Model for Nation Building," World Politics
18 (January, 1966): 177-193.
Heikal, Mohammed, The Sphinx and the Commissar , New York:
Harper and Row, 1978.
Heikal, Mohammed, The Road to Ramadan , New York: Quadrangle,
1975.
Heikal, Mohammed, The Cairo Documents , New York: Doubleday,
1973.
Holt, Peter M., ed., Political and Social Change in Modern
Egypt , New York: Oxford, 1968.
Hopkins, Harry. Egypt the Crucible , Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1970.
Hourani, Albert, ed. , St. Antony's Papers No. 16 and 17:
Middle Eastern Affairs , London: Oxford, 1963 and 19 65.
Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-
1939 , London: Oxford, 1962.
Hudson, Michael C, Arab Politics: Search for Legitimacy ,
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977.
Humphreys, R. Stephen, "Islam and Political Values in
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria," Middle East Journal 33
(Winter, 1979): 1-19.
Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in a Changing Society ,
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 196 8.
Hurewitz, J.C., Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension ,
New York, Praeger, 1969.
Husayn, Taha, The Future of Culture in Egypt , Washington:
American Council of Learned Societies, 1954.
Issawi, Charles, Egypt in Revolution , New York: Oxford, 1967.
Janowitz, Morris, Military Institutions and Coercion in
the Developing Nations , Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1977.
Joint Publications Research Service.
L32

Kabir, Humanyun, Science , Democracy and Islam / London:
Oxford, 1955.
Kedourie, Elie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle
Eastern Essays , London: Oxford, 1970.
Kerr, Malcolm, "Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with
Israel," and "The United Arab Republic: Domestic,
Political and Economic Background of Foreign Policy,"
In Political Dynamics in the Middle East , pp. 31-68 and
195-224. Edited by Paul Hammond and Sidney S. Alexander,
New York: Elsevier, 1972.
Kerr, Malcolm, "Egypt," In Education and Political Development ,
pp. 169-194. Edited by James S. Coleman, Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.
Kerr, Malcolm, "Arab Radical Notions of Democracy," In
St. Antony's Papers No. 16: Middle Eastern Affairs ,
pp. 9-40, Edited by Albert Hourani, London: Oxford, 1963.
Kerr, Malcolm and Leites, Nathan, Inter-Arab Conflict Con-
tingencies , Report 2371-NA, Santa Monica: Rand, 1978.
Khadduri, Majid, Political Trends in the Arab World , Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970
.
Khalid, Khalid Mohammed, Min Huna Nabda
'
(From Here We Start)
,
Trans, by Ismael R. al-Faruqi, 3d ed. , Washington:
American Council of the Learned, 1953.
Koury, Enver M. , The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab
Revolutionary-Progressive States , Hague: Mouton, 1970.
Lacouture, Jean and Lacouture, Simone, Egypt in Transition ,
London: Methuen, 195 8.
Lane, Edward W., Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians ,
London: Ward, Lockand and Bowden, 1842
.
LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, ed. , Political Parties
and Political Development , Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1966.
Laquer, Walter Z., ed., The Middle East in Transition , New
York: Praeger, 1958.
Lasswell, Harold, Politics: Who Gets What, When and How ,
New York: Praeger, 1936.
Ledien, Carl, "Arab Nationalism Today," Middle East Review
11 (Winter, 1978-1979): 54-61.
133

Lemarchand, R. and Legg, K., "Political Clientelism and
Development," Comparative Politics 4 (January, 1972):
149-178.
Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs , 4th
ed. , Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980
.
Lenczowski, George, ed., Political Elites in the Middle
East , Washington: AEI , 1975.
Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East , Glencoe: Free Press, 1958.
Lewy, Guenter, The Egyptian Revolution: Nasserism and Islam
,
Springfieldl Gov't Clearing House, 1968
.
Lutfiyya, Abdulla M. and Churchill, Charles W. , ed.
Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Cultures
,
Hague: Mouton, 1970.
Mabro, Robert, Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972 , Oxford:
Clarendon, 1974.
Mackie, Alan, "Revival of the Wafd Party Reflects Pressures
on Open Door Policy," Middle East Economic Digest , 24
February 1978, p. 3.
Mahfouz, Kosheri al, Socialisme et Pouvoir en Egypte , Paris:
Pichon, 1972.
Malek, Anwar Abdel, Egypt: Military Society , New York:
Random House, 196 8
.
Mansfield, Peter, Arabs , New York: Penguin, 1978.
Mansfield, Peter, The Middle East , 4th ed., London: Oxford,
1973.
Mater, Fuad, "After the Deluge: Egypt's Parliament Finds
its Voice," New Middle East 52 (January-February, 1973):
45-47.
Mayfield, James B., Local Institutions and Egyptian Rural
Development
, Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1974
.
Mayfield, James B., Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt , Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1971.
Meisel, J.H., The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca




Middle East Economic Digest .
Middle East Intelligence Survey .
Moore, Clement H., "Clientelist Ideology and Political
Change: Fictitious Networks in Egypt and Tunisia,"
In Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies
,
pp. 255-271, Edited by Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury,
London: Duckworth, 19 77.
Moore, Clement H., "Authoritarian Politics in an Unicorporated
Society," Comparative Politics 6 (January, 1974):
193-218.
Moughrabi, Fouad M., "The Arab Basic Personality: Critical
Survey of the Literature," International Journal of
Middle East Studies 9 (February, 1978): 99-112.
Naguib, Mohammed, Egypt's Destiny , New York: Doubleday,
1955.
Nasir, Gamal Abdul, Philosophy of the Revolution , New
York: Economica, 19 54.
Nasser, Munir K., Press, Politics and Power: Egypt's Heikal
and Al-Ahram , Ames: Iowa Univ. Press, 19 79.
Nassouhy, Mohammed Gamal, "Local Autonomy under National
Planning: The Egyptian Experience," Ph.D. Dissertation,
Univ. of Southern California, 19 65.
New York Times .
Nuseibeh, Hazem Zaki, The Idea of Arab Nationalism , Ithaca:
Cornell Press, 1956.
Nutting, Anthony, Nasser , New York: Dutton, 1972.
Nyrop, Richard F. et al., Area Handbook for Egypt , 3d ed.,
Washington: GPO, 1976.
Oweiss, Ibrahim M., Some Positive Aspects of the Egyptian
Economy , Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Report,
Washington: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1979.
Patai, Raphael, The Arab Mind , New York: Scribner, 1973.
Patai, Raphael, Society, Culture and Change in the Middle
East , Philadelphia: Univ. Of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.
Peristiany, J.G., ed., Honor and Shame: The Values of




Perlmutter, Amos, The Military and Politics in Modern Times ,
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977.
Perlmutter, Amos, Egypt: Praetorian State , New Brunswick:
Transaction, 1974.
Perlmutter, Amos, "Egypt and the Myth of the New Middle
Class," Comparative Studies in Society and History
10 (October 1967): 46-65.
Peterson, Karen K., "Villagers in Cairo," American Journal
of Sociology 77 (November 1971) : 560-573.
Pierre, Andrew J., "Beyond the Plane Package: Arms and
Politics in the Middle East," International Security
3 (Summer, 1978): 148-161.
Primakov, E., "March 30 Program," New Times 17 (1968): 5.
Pye, Lucian and Verba, Sidney, Political Culture and
Political Development , Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1965.
Qur ' an .
Reed, Stanley, "Egypt After the Elections," MEED Arab Report ,
4 July 1979, pp. 5-6.
Reid, Donald M. , "Rise of Professions and Professional
Organizations in Modern Egypt," Comparative Studies in
Society and History 16 (January, 1974) : 24-57.
Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper
of the Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal
Company , Cairo: Gov't Press, 1956.
Rosenfeld, Henry, "An Overview and Critique of the Literature
on Rural Political and Social Change," In Rural Politics
and Social Change in the Middle East , pp. 45-74, Edited
by Richard T. Antoun and Iliya F. Harik, Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1972.
Roy, Delwin A., Economic Liberalization and the Private
Industry Sector in Egypt , Center for International
Affairs Monograph, Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1977.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Egypt's Search for Stability,"
Current History 76 (January, 1979): 19-22, 36-37.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z., "Egypt of Anwar Sadat," Current History
72 (January, 1977): 36-38.
136

Sadat, Anwar al, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography ,
New York: Harper and Row, 19 78.
Sadat, Anwar al, Revolt on the Nile , New York: John Wiley,
1957.
Safran, Nadav, From War to War , New York: Paegus, 1969.
Safran, Nadav, Egypt In Search of Political Community ,
Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1961.
Salem-Babikian, Norma, "The Sacred and the Profane: Sadat's
Speech to the Knesset," Middle East Journal 34 (Winter,
1980): 13-24.
Sandbrook, Richard, "The Crisis in Political Development
Theory," Journal of Development Studies 12 (January,
1976): 165-185.
Sands, William, ed. , The Arab Nation , Washington: MEI,
1960.
Sawant, Ankush, B. , "Recent Changes in Egypt's Foreign Policy,"
India Quarterly 35 (January-March, 1979): 20-41.
Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf al, Egypt's Liberal Experiment: 1922-
1936 , Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977.
Schmidt, Steffen W. , Guasti, Laura, Lande, Carl and Scott,
James C, ed., Friends, Followers and Factions: A
Reader in Political Clientelism , Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1977.
Smith, David B., "The Egyptian Military Elite: An Opera-
tional Code," M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
1977.
Smith, Donald E. , Religion and Political Development , Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1970.
Springborg, Robert, "Patrimonialism and Policy Making in
Egypt: Nasser and Sadat and the Tenure Policy for
Reclaimed Lands," Middle East Studies 15 (January, 1979):
49-69.
Springborg, Robert, "Sayed Bey Marei and Political Clientelism
in Egypt," Comparative Political Studies 12 (October
1979): 259-288.
Springborg, Robert, "Professional Syndicates in Egyptian
Politics, 1952-1970," International Journal of Middle
East Studies 9 (August, 1978): 275-295.
137

Springborg, Robert, "Patterns of Association in the Egyptian
Political Elite," In Political Elites in the Middle
East
, pp. 83-106, Edited by George Lenczowski, Washington:
AEI, 1975
Springborg, Robert, "The Ties That Bind: Political Asso-
ciation and Policy Making in Egypt," Ph. D. dissertation,
Stanford, 1974.
Stephens, Robert, Nasser , New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
Stevens, Janet, "Political Repression in Egypt," MERIP Reports
8 (April, 1978) : 18-23.
St. John, Robert, The Boss , New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
Tanner, Henry, "Political Parties Restored in Egypt,"
New York Times , 12 November 19 76.
Taylor, Lance, "Political Economy of Egypt: An Opening
to What," Middle East Review 10 (Summer, 1978): 10-15.
United Arab Republic, Ministry of Information, October
Working Paper Presented April, 1974 , Cairo: Gov't
Press, n.d.
United Arab Republic, Presidential Decree of Law No. 124
of 1960 and Executive Regulations , Cairo: Gov't Press,
1960.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Trade , Washington:
GPO, 19 75.
United States Department of State, "Middle East," Department
of State Bulletin 79 (October, 1979): 44-53.
United States Department of State, "Framework for Middle
East Peace," Department of State Bulletin 78 (October,
1978): 1-11.
Vatikiotis, P.J., Nasser and His Generation , New York:
St. Martin's, 1978.
Vatikiotis, P.J., "Egypt's Politics of Conspiracy," Survey
18 (Spring, 1972): 83-99.
Vatikiotis, P.J., ed., Egypt Since the Revolution , New York:
Praeger, 1968.
Vatikiotis, P.J., "Some Political Consequences of the 1952
Revolution," In Political and Social Change in Modern
Egypt




Vatikiotis, P.J., The Egyptian Army in Politics , Bloomington
:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1961.
Verba, Sidney, "Comparative Political Culture," In Political
Culture and Political Development
, pp. 512-560, Edited
by Lucain Pye and Sidney Verba, Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1965.
Vigneau, Jean, "The Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution,"
In The Middle East in Transition
, pp. 129-144, Edited
oy Walter Z. Laquer, New York: Praeger, 19 58.
Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., Modern Islam , Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press, 1962.
Von Grunebaum, Gustave E., ed., Unity and Variety in Muslim
Civilization , Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955.
Waterbury, John "Clientelism Revisited," Government and
Opposition , 14 (Spring, 1979): 216-228.
Waterbury, John, Egypt: Burdens of the Past, Options for the
Future , Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978.
Waterbury, John, The Opening, Part III: De-Nasserization
,
Hanover: American Field Staff Reports, 1975.
Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
,
Translated by Talcott Parsons, New York: Oxford, 1947.
Weiner, Myron, "Political Participation Crisis of the
Political Process," In Crises and Sequences in Political
Development
, pp. 159-204, Edited by Leonard Binder,
Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971.
Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism , New Haven: Yale
Univ. Press, 1957.
Wynn, Wilton, Nasser of Egypt: Search for Dignity , Cambridge,
Arlington, 1959.
Zartman, I. William, "The Study of Elite Circulation,"
Comparative Politics 6 (April, 1974): 465-488.
Zeid, Ahmed Abou, "New Towns and Rural Development in Egypt,"
Africa 49, 3 (1979): 283-290.
Zeidan, Shawky, "Charismatic Leadership and Political
Participation: The Case of Nasser's Egypt," Journal of







1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 014 2 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 56 1
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Professor John W. Amos II, Code 56Am 3
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Professor Kamil T. Said, Code 56Sa 1





Professor Morroe Berger 1
Center for Near Eastern Studies
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
7. Marquat Memorial Library 1
John F. Kennedy Center for Military
Assistance
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307
8. David J. Anthony, CPT, US Army 3
Tunis (FSI)












Pol i tical culture




ScaT culture and the **»£&
Tot? 660 99163 23
5dLEY KNOX LIBRARY,
H
BBWH
'-.''. ••'':'.'...
-
..'«„<•,-••".•.'.*SHmH•'"•:'
H
•
--V
:-;>
